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CORPORATE SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
STANDARDS IN THE GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN:
RESISTANCE, RECONSIDERATION,
AND RESOLUTION IN CHINA
Li-Wen Lin*
ABSTRACT
This Article provides a view on corporate social accounta-
bility standards from a Chinese perspective, a slightly different
angle from that of legal scholars in the United States. The legal
literature in the United States typically only focuses on the im-
portance and effectiveness of corporate social accountability
standards to regulate the conduct of multinational companies in
the era of globalization. However, the views of the outsourced
companies in the developing countries, on which the multina-
tional companies impose the standards, have seldom received
attention. This Article tries to fill this void by examining the
situation in China. As shown in this Article, effective imple-
mentation of corporate social accountability standards requires
a refined approach that considers local circumstances in devel-
oping countries.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Numerous definitions of globalization scatter the landscapes
of policy discussions and everyday conversations. The definitions
might be intentionally constructed to fit in a particular context or
to achieve a particular purpose. Notwithstanding different contexts
and purposes, economic factors and concerns are at the center of
the definition of globalization both for pro- and anti-globalization
groups. Martin Wolf, associate editor and chief economics com-
mentator at the Financial Times, states in his book Why Globaliza-
tion Works:
Globalization is defined in what follows as integration of eco-
nomic activities, via markets. The driving forces are technologi-
cal and policy changes - falling costs of transport and
communications and greater reliance on market forces. The ec-
onomic globalization discussed here has cultural, social and po-
litical consequences (and preconditions). But those
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consequences and preconditions are neither part of its definition
nor a focus of our attention.1
Although the meaning of globalization is limited to the eco-
nomic sense, the controversy of globalization usually revolves
around its social consequences.2
The emergence of the global supply chain demonstrates a typi-
cal example of economic integration and the accompanying social
consequences. With the great reduction in transportation costs and
the help of international trade agreements, goods may be produced
in locations with competitive advantages, and they may be sold
around the world "through complex production and distribution
systems under a variety of organizational and legal arrangements."'
3
To utilize the competitive advantages of a location for manufactur-
ing a certain product, foreign companies do not have to set up their
own facilities in that location. Direct investment in a country with
unfamiliar cultural and business environments is costly. By con-
tracting with the local manufacturers, foreign companies can tap
the resources in the host country without the pain and risks associ-
ated with direct investment. This is exactly what multinational
companies such as Nike are doing in this era of economic integra-
tion. They outsource the supply chain operations in developing
countries to produce products at competitive prices and then sell
the products to markets around the world, largely to developed
countries. This type of business strategy has some important legal
implications. First, without directly controlling factories and hiring
workers in the host country, foreign companies are not constrained
by the environmental regulations and labor protection laws in the
host country. Second, although one may argue that foreign compa-
nies may be subject to the laws of their home countries in regulat-
ing their business activities abroad, U.S. experience casts doubt on
the effectiveness of this approach.4 Third, multinational companies
1 MARTIN WOLF, WHY GLOBALIZATION WORKS 19 (2004).
2 See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION (2004) (debating whether
globalization harms or helps children, women, labor, culture, democracy, and the
environment).
3 PHILIP B. SCHARY & TAGE SKJOTr-LARSEN, MANAGING THE GLOBAL SUPPLY
CHAIN 16 (1998) (explaining the concept of the global supply chain).
4 See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic
Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 750-72 (2002) (arguing that, at the moment, the
Alien Tort Claims Act imposes weak constraints on corporate activities because of
problems relating to the construction of causes of action, state sovereignty, forum non
conveniens, and personal jurisdiction over defendants); see also David Kinley & Junko
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are not constrained by international law either. Traditionally, mul-
tinational companies have not been directly subject to interna-
tional law because they lack an international legal personality.
Although there are some international legal instruments asserting
that multinational companies have a duty to the community, they
are either non-binding declarations or lack enforcement and moni-
toring mechanisms.5
The supply manufacturers in developing countries that con-
tract with multinational companies are usually small companies
measured on an international scale. These small manufacturers
profit from the multinationals' cost-reduction strategy. They make
profits not from selling advanced knowledge, but from selling
cheap labor. To be competitive and profitable, these suppliers do
not pay much attention to labor protection concerns and some-
times even egregiously violate laws, gaining profits at the expense
of workers' health and lives. Meanwhile, the product market in the
developed countries has become so competitive that multinational
companies are pressed to squeeze every penny out of their opera-
tions, including their supply chains. Therefore, multinational com-
panies do not have strong incentives to consider the production
processes of their suppliers in developing countries. Price is their
primary, if not only, concern. Workers' rights suffer in this unregu-
lated global supply chain.
The plight of workers in developing countries in the global
supply chain has been revealed through numerous reports, which
have raised consumer awareness in developed countries and re-
sulted in movements against goods produced in sweatshops. In re-
sponse, multinational companies are incorporating corporate social
accountability standards into their supply chain operations. These
standards can be internal voluntary codes of conduct established by
a multinational company itself or external voluntary standards es-
tablished by non-governmental organizations. This Article focuses
on the latter. Examples of the external standards are: SA8000, es-
tablished by Social Accountability International (SAI); the Work-
place Code of Conduct by the Fair Labor Association (FLA); and
the Apparel Certification Program by Worldwide Responsible Ap-
parel Production (WRAP). Although the details of these stan-
Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corpora-
tions at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 931, 939-44 (2004).
5 See Kinley & Tadaki, supra note 4, at 947-51.
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dards are different, they share some general commonalities. They
are based on the International Labor Organization (ILO) Declara-
tion on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, and they are
structured with a monitoring system.6
The legal literature in the United States typically focuses on
the importance or insufficiency of corporate social accountability
standards to regulate the conduct of multinational companies.7
The manner in which the people working in the outsourced facto-
ries in the developing world view these standards has seldom been
discussed. This Article aims to fill this vacuum.
China, characterized as "the world's factory," plays an impor-
tant role in the global supply chain. Since the corporate social ac-
countability standards, whether internal or external, are largely
implemented in factories, incorporation of such standards into the
global supply chain unsurprisingly has great impact on the manu-
facturers in China. 8 Major newspapers in China have frequently
reported anecdotes of factories losing business from multinational
companies because they failed to meet corporate social accounta-
6 See COMMITTEE ON MONITORING INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, MONITORING INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS: TECHNIQUES
AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION 78-84 (2004) (comparing FLA, SA8000, and WRAP
standards).
"7 See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the
Next Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 433 (2005) (arguing that governments should
provide "carrots" and "sticks" for corporate codes of conduct to be effective); Kinley &
Tadaki, supra note 4, at 952-60 (explaining the impact of corporate codes of conduct);
Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, 20
BERKELEY J. INT'L. L. 45, 78-81 (2002) (explaining the partially binding aspect of volun-
tary codes of conduct). See generally Mark B. Baker, Tightening the Toothless Vise: Codes
of Conduct and the American Multinational Enterprise, 20 Wis. INT'L L.J. 89 (2001); Lance
Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, Enforcing International Labor Rights Through
Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663 (1995); Thomas F. McIner-
ney et al., Putting Regulation Before Responsibility: The Limits of Voluntary Corporate
Social Responsibility, in 2 VOICES OF DEVELOPMENT JURISTS (2005), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=658081; Charles Sabel et al., Ratcheting La-
bor Standards: Regulation for Continuous Improvement in the Global Workplace, in So-
CIAL PROTECTION DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES (May 2000), available at http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-papers/Labor-Market-
DP/0011.pdf.
8 See KUA GUO GONG SI DE SHE HUI ZE REN YU ZHONGGUO SHE HUI [SOCIAL RESPON-
SIBILITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS & THE CHINESE SOCIETY] 19 (Tan Shen &
Liu Kaiming eds., 2003) [hereinafter SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNAT. CORPS.]
(roughly estimating that at least 8000 factories in the coastal area have been investigated
by multinational companies about corporate social practices since 1995 to the time of this
research). The report was part of the labor research series conducted by Tsinghua Univer-
sity in Beijing, supported by the Ford Foundation. Id.
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bility standards. The most popular external social accountability
standard for manufacturers in China is SA8000, although currently
the number of factories certified under SA8000 is relatively small
compared to the total number of factories in China.9 SA8000 has
raised a heated debate in China. 10 There are two competing opin-
ions in China about the role of corporate social accountability stan-
dards in the global supply chain. The standards are widely viewed
as creating either a technical trade barrier in favor of developed
countries or a passport to the global market. Opponents criticize
the protectionism, commercialization, and value-imperialism of
corporate social accountability standards, while proponents view
these standards not as external pressure but as internalized values
that promote sustainable growth. Scholars, companies, and the
Chinese government regularly exchange opinions with regard to
this issue.
This Article provides an overview of the changing attitude to-
ward corporate social accountability standards in China ? from un-
compromising resistance, to reconsideration, and then to promising
resolution. Part II explains the formation of corporate social ac-
countability standards and their function in the global supply chain.
Part III discusses criticisms of the standards and the causes of resis-
tance in China. Part IV analyzes the criticisms in Part III and iden-
tifies benefits from the implementation of corporate social
accountability standards in China. Part V describes the attitude of
the Chinese government and the responses of the companies in
China. Part VI gives recommendations on how to overcome the
resistance in China and turn the external pressure into internalized
values. Although this Article examines the situation in China, the
analysis may also apply to other developing countries where corpo-
rate social accountability standards are struggling to become
accepted.
9 According to Social Accountability International, there are 129 certified facilities in
China as of September 30, 2006. There are 1112 facilities certified around the world. Italy
has the most facilities certified (395), followed by India (141) and then China (129). See
Social Accountability International, http://www.sa-intl.org (follow "SA8000" hyperlink;
then follow "Certified SA8000 facilities" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
10 The debate has been raised by news reports since 2003. Mei yu xiang wo tui SA8000
dabang, zhusanjiao kong cheng zhong zhaiqu [The United States Wants to Use the Stick of
SA8000, the Pearl Delta Likely to be a Disaster Zone] GD HK INFO DAILY (P.R.C.), Dec.
11, 2003. This news report planted an important seed of the debate.
[Vol. 15:321
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II. CORPORATE SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY STANDARDS
A. Formation: SA8000
With the great reduction in transportation costs, multinational
companies can manufacture products in developing countries
where labor cost is substantially lower than in developed countries
and then sell the products around the world at a competitive price.
The low labor cost in developing countries is partly due to low
levels of labor protection because of either lack of regulation or
lack of enforcement by the local governments." Since the 1990s,
the media has frequently exposed sweatshop practices in develop-
ing countries by multinational companies or their suppliers.1
2 Mul-
tinational companies, mainly driven by enlightened self-interest,
have adopted corporate social accountability standards respon-
sively, to repair their tarnished images, or preventively, to maintain
customer goodwill.' 3 The standards can be internal codes of con-
duct established by a company itself or external standards usually
set by non-governmental organizations and sometimes accompa-
nied by verification mechanisms. SA8000 falls into the latter
group. Although there are many external corporate social ac-
countability standards in the world, this Article selects SA8000 as
an example because it is the most hotly discussed standard in
China.
SA8000 is a set of auditable corporate social accountability
standards established in 1997 by the Council on Economic Priori-
II Note that this is just one of the reasons for low labor costs. Low living expenses in
developing countries result in lower wages, but this does not necessitate labor exploitation.
12 See, e.g., Philip Shenon, Made in the U.S.A.?-Hard Labor on a Pacific Island/A
Special Report; Saipan Sweatshops Are No American Dream, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1993, at
Al (reporting that labor exploitations were found in the suppliers for Arrow, Liz Clai-
borne, The Gap, Montgomery Ward, Geoffrey Beene, Eddie Bauer, and Levi Strauss).
13 See Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling Schemes:
The Limits and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights Through Private Ini-
tiatives, 30 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus 111, 114-15 (1998) (arguing that self-interest motiva-
tion is the predominant reason multinational companies adopt codes of conduct); Harvey
L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A
Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1573-1600 (1990) (provid-
ing a historical review of the growth of codes of conduct fostered by scandals); Murphy,
supra note 7, at 397-403 (explaining the impetus for the proliferation of codes of conduct);
KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT & RICHARD B. FREEMAN, CAN LABOR STANDARDS IMPROVE
UNDER GLOBALIZATION? 42-46 (2003) (describing firms' practice of adopting codes of
conduct because they believe that "consumers will penalize them if they do not undertake
corrective action" and analyzing firms' cost-and-benefit calculation of adopting higher la-
bor standards).
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ties Accreditation Association (CEPAA) and now supervised by
Social Accountability International (SAI). 14 SA8000 addresses na-
tional law compliance and incorporates International Labor Or-
ganization conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child."5 To
measure the performance of a company with regard to labor pro-
tection, SA8000 provides criteria in nine different areas: child la-
bor, forced labor, health and safety, freedom of association and
right to collective bargaining, discrimination, discipline, working
hours, compensation, and management systems.16
In addition to establishing standards, an important feature of
SA8000 is its verification system, which was designed to overcome
the criticisms about monitoring insufficiencies that usually discredit
voluntary corporate social accountability standards. As of Novem-
ber 2007, SAI had accredited seventeen auditing companies to con-
duct monitoring and certification. 17 To be certified under the
SA8000 standard, a facility must first conduct a preliminary inter-
nal assessment of compliance with SA8000 and make any changes
to conditions or policies as required by the standard. Then, an au-
diting company accredited by the SAI will conduct an initial assess-
ment and provide corrective action requests for the applicant
facility. After making changes in accordance with the corrective
action requests, the facility may contact the auditing company to
arrange a full certification audit. If it passes the audit, the facility
will be certified. An SA8000 certification is good for three years.
There will be surveillance audits every six months, or once a year if
the certification auditor deems that the facility is performing very
well in complying with the standard.'" The cost of obtaining a
SA8000 certification is comprised of certification fees as well as
corrective/compliance costs.19 The amount of the corrective com-
14 CEPAA changed its name to SAI in 2000.
15 See Social Accountability 8000, art. 11 (2001), available at http://www.sa-intl.org/in-
dex.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageld=710&parentlD=540&grandparentlD=473&
nodelD=1 (follow "Official English Version" hyperlink; then follow "PDF" hyperlink)
(last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
16 See Social Accountability International, Overview of SA8000, http://www.sa-intl.org/
index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageld=473 (last visited Nov. 26, 2007).
17 See Social Accountability International, SA8000 Accredited Certification Bodies,
http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageld=702 (last visited Oct.
28, 2007).
18 See id.
19 See You-HUAN Li, SA8000 ZHONGGUO QIYESHEHUI ZHEREN JIANSHE [SA 8000
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF CHINESE CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY] 178 (2004).
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pliance costs vary from facility to facility depending on the degree
of non-compliance and on the number of workers.
B. Function in the Global Supply Chain: The Perspective
of Multinational Companies
Prior to globalization, companies only competed with other
domestic companies who were subject to the same cost basis and
regulatory environment. However, globalization has forced com-
panies to compete with one another, regardless of size, origin, and
industry. In order to survive in the competitive global market,
companies have adopted new business management methods, pri-
marily focusing on reshaping supply chains for cost reduction.20 In
the last decade, companies have "shifted responsibility for produc-
tion and materials managements, whenever possible, to their sup-
pliers" in order to reduce inventory carrying costs and shorten
product cycle time.21 Since companies do not have direct control
over their suppliers' factories, supply chain management is impor-
tant to ensure the smooth flow of supply. Supply chain manage-
ment typically focuses on price, delivery speed, quality, and
reliability.
For the most part, the suppliers are located in those develop-
ing countries that offer cheap labor and regulatory exemption priv-
ileges. From a multinational company's standpoint, there are
multiple layers of suppliers: from its first-tier suppliers over which
it has great visibility to its suppliers' suppliers over which it has
minimal visibility or control. Each company, regardless of its size,
only occupies a fragment of the global supply chain.22 Therefore,
multinational companies may very well argue that they are incapa-
ble of controlling their suppliers, in particular, those hidden under
multiple layers of contracting. Ostensibly, the shift of manufactur-
ing to suppliers in developing countries and the invisibility of those
suppliers may also offer a justification to shift the labor and envi-
ronmental protection costs associated with the manufacturing pro-
cess to the suppliers. This is an important economic reason for
multinational companies to expansively utilize suppliers in the de-
veloping countries. However, revelations about sweatshop prac-
tices hidden in the extended and entangled supply chain and traced
20 See DALE NEEF, THE SUPPLY CHAIN IMPERATIVE: How TO ENSURE ETHICAL BE-
HAVIORAL IN YOUR GLOBAL SUPPLIERS 36 (2004).
21 See id. at 35.
22 See id. at 42-57.
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back to multinational companies has brought a deluge of condem-
nation by consumers in major markets. This suggests that the ob-
jective of supply chain management should be to obtain not only
high quality products at low prices with timely delivery but also to
do so in a socially responsible manner. Corporate social accounta-
bility standards are a tool for multinational companies to manage
risks arising from socially irresponsible conduct by their suppliers
in the global supply chain.23 In sum, from the multinational com-
panies' perspective, the basic function of corporate social accounta-
bility standards is to assure that labor rights are respected in the
process of production and to control legal and reputation risks.
The assurance process may be done internally by the employee au-
ditors of multinational companies or externally by third parties,
such as auditing firms or non-governmental organizations.
III. RESISTANCE TO CORPORATE SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
STANDARDS IN CHINA
In 1980, the seeds of the global supply chain were planted in
China at four special economic zones. 24 Over the past two de-
cades, they have grown and stretched beyond the fences of the des-
ignated zones and now cover a large part of China. With China's
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), whose goal is
to promote global economic integration, the global supply chain
will certainly be more entrenched and rampant. Incorporation of
corporate social accountability standards into the global supply
chain certainly has great impact on China. As mentioned above,
such incorporation grows out of consumer demand in Western
countries. In the legal literature of the United States, the incorpo-
ration of corporate social accountability standards is usually touted
as one of the important mechanisms to hold multinational compa-
nies responsible for their misconduct in developing countries.2 5
However, this view is not popular in China, the world's third larg-
est trader. 26 This section summarizes the arguments against corpo-
23 See Robert Spekman et al., Corporate Social Responsibility and Global Supply Chain
Management: A Normative Perspective (Darden Graduate Sch. of Bus. Admin., Univ. of
Virginia, Working Paper No. 04-05, June 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=655
223.
24 The Chinese government established four special economic zones: Shenzhen,
Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen.
25 See supra note 7.
26 See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 2005 at 1
(2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2005_e/its2OO5-e.pdf.
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rate social accountability standards currently implemented in the
global supply chain and discusses the causes of resistance in China.
The resistance stems from four areas: protectionism, commerciali-
zation, imbalance of bargaining power, and lack of localization.
A. Protectionism
Incorporation of corporate social standards into the global
supply chain has been stigmatized as a protectionist measure by the
developed countries aimed at undercutting the competitiveness of
developing countries. This view is pervasive among the industrial
sectors and influences on every debate of corporate social stan-
dards in China.27
Opponents emphasize the susceptibility of corporate social ac-
countability standards to protectionist abuse. The protectionist
goal may be obtained by requiring developing countries to raise
labor protection or else developed countries reject access to their
markets, thereby protecting domestic industries and unskilled jobs
in developed countries. Companies can usually save labor-related
costs in developing countries where labor laws are not enforced or
under-enforced. The lack of enforcement of labor laws may be the
result of a combination of legislative vacuum, lack of resources,
and government favoritism toward enterprises. However, compa-
nies in developing countries may not enjoy the same amount of
savings from a regulatory advantage when corporate social ac-
countability is a criterion of supplier selection by multinational
companies in developed countries. The bodies supervising corpo-
rate social accountability standards are multinational companies
themselves, auditing firms, or independent organizations. These
multinational companies and auditing bodies, which are well-
equipped with resources and have business reputations at stake,
press suppliers in developing countries to meet certain social and
legal standards harder than the local governments do. The differ-
ence between enforcement by the local government and enforce-
27 SA8000, the most hotly discussed corporate social accountability standard in Chinese
newspapers and media, often has been described as a new technical trade barrier. See, e.g.,
Zhongguo zuohao zhunbei ying tiaozhan [China Gets Ready to Take Challenges], PEOPLE
DAILY (P.R.C.), Oct. 22, 2004 (reporting that the US, EU, and Japan will continue to use
technical trade barriers, intellectual property rights, and SA8000 to increase China's textile
production costs and curtail China's competitiveness); Fada guojia yu qiangxing tuixing
SA8000 biaozhun renzheng [Developed Countries Want to Impose the SA8000 Certifica-
tion], MARKET POST (P.R.C.), May 14, 2004.
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ment by multinational companies or auditing organizations is the
main concern of supplier companies in China. The inspections by
local governments in China are perfunctory, which explains why
SA8000 aroused so much anxiety among companies in China, even
though the contents of SA8000 are not vastly different from the
requirements of China's labor laws. 28 The supplier companies in
China can no longer slash compliance costs by disregarding the la-
bor rights protected by law and corporate social accountability
standards. This may narrow the wide gap in the price of labor be-
tween China and developed countries and, hopefully, may alleviate
the problem of unemployment among unskilled labor in developed
countries. Supplier companies failing to comply with the corporate
social accountability standards will lose business and thus be de-
nied access to the markets in developed countries.29
In addition, many are skeptical about the intentions behind
the adoption of corporate social accountability standards in the
global supply chain given the low certification rate among compa-
nies in developed countries.3 ° The SA8000 certified facilities are
disproportionately located in developing countries.3" Companies
in countries where corporate social responsibility is zealously pro-
moted are surprisingly absent from the certification list.32 Al-
though it may be argued that companies in developed countries
28 See LI-QING Li & YAN-LING Li, QIYE SHEHUI ZEREN YANJIU [STUDIES ON ENTER-
PRISE'S SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY] 229 (2005).
29 Many anecdotes of supplier companies in China losing business from multinational
companies were reported by the media. See, e.g., Shehui zheren renzheng kauyan zhong-
guo chukou qiye [Corporate Social Certification Challenges Chinese Exporting Companies]
NANFANG DAILY (P.R.C.), Jun. 24, 2004 (reporting that a toy company having four facto-
ries and nearly 8000 workers in Shenzhen lost business from its multinational buyers and
closed down in 2002 because of low wages, long working hours, and poor working condi-
tions). See also Chukou qiye zhi shehui renzheng [Corporate Social Accountability Certifi-
cation of Exporting Companies], NANFANG CITY (P.R.C.), Dec. 22, 2005 (reporting that
in Zhongshen City of the Guangdong Province, a shoe factory with about 500 workers, was
reported to have cancelled orders by its buyers for two months in 2002 because of non-
compliance of the legal minimum wages requirement.)
30 See You-HUAN LI, supra note 19, at 69.
31 See id. Countries listed are in order of the number of facilities certified as of Decem-
ber 31, 2006: Italy (503), India (190), China (140), Brazil (97), Pakistan (58), Vietnam (31),
Thailand (22), Spain (16), Taiwan (9), France (7), Poland (7), Sri Lanka (7), Switzerland
(6), Argentina (6), Greece (6), Israel (5), Philippines (5), Hong Kong (5), Indonesia (4),
Portugal (4), Turkey (4), Belgium (4), Bolivia (4), UK (4), Costa Rica (3), Czech Republic
(2), Korea (2), Romania (2), Bangladesh (2), Japan (2), Mauritius (2), Peru (2). Social
Accountability International, http://www.saasaccreditation.org/facilities_by-country.htm
(last visited Oct. 28, 2007).
32 See You-HUAN LI, supra note 19, at 69.
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already have better working conditions and labor rights, it is doubt-
ful that they have perfected labor protection.33 Further, the low
rate of unionization among workers in the United States, where the
SA8000 standard was established, casts doubt on the real inten-
tions behind requiring companies in developing countries to estab-
lish freedom of association.34
B. Commercialization
High certification and consulting fees create an impression of
commercialization of corporate social accountability standards in
China. In order to be a certified supplier of a particular multina-
tional company or to be certified under a particular set of corpo-
rate social standards established by a non-governmental
organization, suppliers have to go through a complex certification
procedure. Take the SA8000 certification as an example. The SAI
does not provide any certification service directly to applicant com-
panies. Rather, the SAI accredits certification firms to perform
this task.3" An applicant facility may submit its application and rel-
evant documents directly to a certification firm.36 If the certifica-
tion firm finds the documents satisfactory, the certification firm
will conduct on-site inspections to see if the applicant facility really
meets the required standards.37 Theoretically a certification will
only be issued after the non-compliance items reported in inspec-
tions are corrected.38 Unfamiliarity with the SA8000 standards and
great volumes of documents usually force applicant facilities to
seek help from consulting firms prior to the certification applica-
tion in order to go through the certification process smoothly. The
certification fees plus consulting fees, particularly the latter, may
be very costly for a small company.39 It is believed that the high
consulting fees in China are products of the unregulated certifica-
33 See id.
34 The U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that 12.5% of
wage and salary workers were union members in 2005. See Union Member Summary,
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2007).
35 See Social Accountability International, http://www.sa-intl.org (last visited Dec. 2,
2006).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 This is not always the reality in China. See discussion infra.
39 See You-Huan Li, supra note 19, at 265-66. In China, a facility with 300 workers is
charged around $9000 by a certification firm, but the consulting fees are usually several
times the amount of the certification fees. Id. Surveyed companies spent over 500,000
RMB (about $62,500) for certification and consulting fees. Id.
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tion markets. 40  Applicant facilities unfamiliar with the SA8000
standards are vulnerable to unreasonable charges by consulting
firms. This is a particularly serious problem when applicant facili-
ties have difficulties complying with the standards.4'
Further, incompetence of auditors in certification firms and
easy manipulation by applicant facilities mar the good intentions of
corporate social accountability standards and make the commer-
cialization image more conspicuous. A large number of auditors in
China are well-qualified to perform product quality certification
but inexperienced and ill-trained in labor protection.42 Notice of
inspection is frequently given in advance, and thus inspected facili-
ties have enough time to create the appearance of compliance.43
The superficiality of the certification process makes many Chinese
supplier companies believe that money can settle the matter.44
C. Imbalance of Bargaining Power
Currently, the main reason supplier companies in China im-
plement social accountability standards is because buyers press
them to do so.45 These supplier companies are mostly in labor-
intensive industries, particularly in apparel and toys manufactur-
ing.46 These industries are classic examples of buyer-driven com-
modity chains. "A commodity chain refers to the whole range of
activities involved in the design, production, and marketing of a
product."'47 "Buyer-driven commodity chains refer to those indus-
tries in which large retailers, branded marketers, and branded man-
ufacturers play the pivotal roles in setting up decentralized
40 See id., 19, at 259-68.
41 See id., at 265-66.
42 See SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNAT. CORPS., supra note 8, at 14.
43 See id.
44 Not only do companies have such an impression, but labor protection experts in
China also have such an impression. For example, Wang Lin, the Chief Technical Advisor
to the International Labor Organization (ILO) in China, said that SAI is a consulting com-
pany that sets up its own standard and tries to sell it. Although Wang Lin misunderstood
the role of SAL, her remark does reflect commercialization of SA8000 in China. See Bei
kuada le de SA8000 renzheng [The Exaggerated SA8000 Certification], 172 ECONOMIC OB-
SERVER (2004) (P.R.C.).
45 See SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNAT. CORPS., supra note 8, at 73.
46 The SA8000 certified facilities in China are mostly in the apparel, toys, and accesso-
ries industries. See Social Accountability International, http://www.sa-intl.org/ (last visited
Apr. 11, 2006). However, the labor-intensive characteristic does not seem applicable to
Italy, where the certified facilities are usually in the transportation and services industries.
47 Gary Gereffi, International Trade and Industrial Upgrading in the Apparel Commod-
ity Chain, 48 J. INT'L ECON. 37, 38 (1999).
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production networks in a variety of exporting countries," particu-
larly developing countries.4" Profits in the buyer-driven chains are
gained from "unique combinations of high-value research, design,
sales, marketing and financial services that allow the retailers,
branded marketers and branded manufacturers to act as strategic
brokers in linking overseas factories with evolving product niches
in the main consumer markets."4 9 With the power to shape con-
sumer demands in markets through the use of brand names and
strategic networks, the buyers (retailers, branded marketers, and
branded manufacturers) have leverage in the price bargaining with
suppliers in developing countries5 ° and are able to press the suppli-
ers to implement corporate social accountability standards at the
suppliers' own costs. To attract consumers, the buyers usually ad-
vertise themselves as socially responsible companies and then shift
the costs of implementation to the suppliers with weak bargaining
power.5
These multinational buyers want to purchase products of high
quality, at low prices, made in a socially responsible manner. How-
ever, low prices and socially responsible production do not always
go together. Better working conditions involve increases in pro-
duction costs, and such costs can not always be balanced by im-
proved productivity alone. If the buyers do not reward the socially
responsible suppliers by purchasing products with prices reflecting
48 Id. at 41-42.
49 1d. at 43. As opposed to buyer-driven commodity chains, producer-driven commod-
ity chains refer to "those in which large, usually transnational, manufacturers play the cen-
tral roles in coordinating production networks." Id. at 41. The typical example of
producer-driven commodity chains is the automobile industry. Profits in the producer
commodity chain are gained from "scale, volume, and technological advances." Id. at 43.
50 Id. at 43; see also SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNAT. CORPS., supra note 8, at
164-66.
51 See, e.g., SOCtAL RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNAT. CORPS., supra note 8, at 81; Dexter
Roberts & Pete Engardio, Secrets, Lies and Sweatshops, BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 27, 2006, at
50; Nike zjie yo "Baoshengong" sh chanyelien zhubu chengshou de biren ma? [Nike Dis-
closes Its Suppliers. Is It Necessary for the Supply Chain to be Gradually Mature?], Bus.
WATCH MAG., Jun. 7, 2005 (P.R.C.) (referencing the multinational branded companies'
suppliers in Guangdong, China and reporting that the suppliers complained that they were
struggling to generate profits under the price pressure and social accountability require-
ments from the multinational companies; also reporting that one of Nike's textile suppliers,
with around 700 workers, confessed that it could not afford to fully implement the social
accountability standards and therefore provided false information and only insured 50% of
its workers); Qiye shehui zheren de zhongguo zh lu [China's Road to Corporate Social
Responsibility] NANFANG WEEKEND (P.R.C.), July 21, 2005 (reporting that a Timberland
clothes supplier confirmed that the price offered by Timberland had dropped by 30% over
the past few years while its labor protection cost had risen by 30%).
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the increase in production costs, the suppliers, in order to survive,
will likely create the appearance of social responsibility without ac-
tually making any improvements.52 The burden of implementation
costs is the main concern for the suppliers in China. Surveys show
that the buyers do not effectively reward socially responsible sup-
pliers.5 3 This is because the decision to place an order with a sup-
plier is controlled by the buyer's procurement department, which
prefers low prices, while a supplier's compliance with social ac-
countability standards is considered by another department, which
does not influence the purchase decision4.5  Such policy schizophre-
nia of the buyers causes the suppliers to question the buyers' com-
mitment to corporate social accountability. This schizophrenia also
might encourage some suppliers to "buy" an appearance of social
accountability.
D. Lack of Localization and Value Imperialism
Consumer pressure in the developed countries is the major im-
petus for the multinational companies' adopting social accountabil-
ity standards into their supplier selection criteria. Inevitably,
multinational companies cater to the consumers' concern or inter-
est in the developed countries. However, the interest of the con-
sumers in the developed countries does not always dovetail with
the need of the workers and the reality in the developing countries.
Many of the corporate social accountability standards, includ-
ing SA8000, refer to freedom of association, one of the core labor
rights in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work. 56 However, the reality in China is that indepen-
52 See HELLE BANK JORGENSEN ET AL., WORLD BANK GROUP, STRENGTHENING IM-
PLEMENTATION OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS 20
(2003), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPSD/Resources/CSR/Strength-
ening_Implementatio.pdf ("[slome apparel suppliers confessed that they skillfully had de-
veloped the art of seeming to be in compliance without making changes"); SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNAT. CORPS., supra note 8, at 186 (a Nike manager engaging in
corporate social responsibility matters in China said in an interview that 40%-50% of in-
formation provided by China suppliers is false); Roberts & Engardio, supra note 51 (re-
porting on the pervasiveness of falsifying records).
53 See JORGENSEN ET AL., supra note 52, at 27-29; SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANS-
NAT. CORPS., supra note 8, at 40-43.
54 See SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNAT. CORPS., supra note 8, at 43.
55 See supra notes 51 & 52.
56 For more information, see ILO website, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARA-
TIONWEB.ABOUTDECLARATIONHOME?var_language=EN (last visited Dec. 9,
2007).
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dent organizations by workers are prohibited. Although unions
may be formally created within a company, such unions should be
subject to supervision of the All China Federation of Trade Un-
ions, which is essentially an agent of the Chinese government.57
There is a common claim by the suppliers in China that requir-
ing companies in China to comply with social accountability stan-
dards ignores the reality that most of the indigenous companies are
still in early stages of development and accumulation of capital.
During this stage, many companies lack the resources to devote to
labor protection. Surveys show that only a company that has
grown to a certain size can afford to consider labor protection
issues.58
The resistance to corporate social accountability standards
partly derives from differences in the underlying value of human
resources. Such standards are the product of western civil societies
in which the values of the division of labor and human resources
have long been respected. 59 However, mainstream Chinese society
traditionally has never shared these values. For thousands of years,
Chinese society has held intellectuals (or those who earn their live-
lihood through knowledge) in high esteem and despised those who
support themselves through labor. The concept of "men" in the
Analects of Confucius mostly refers to intellectual persons, not to
the uneducated commoners. Confucius stressed the hard-working
virtue of the common people (peasants) in terms of benefits to the
57 See Stephen F. Diamond, The "Race To The Bottom" Returns: China's Challenge To
The International Labor Movement, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 39 (2003) (detailing
the role of the All China Federation of Trade Unions).
58 In China, companies with fewer than 1000 workers tend to object to corporate social
accountability standards because of past management experience and low accumulation of
capital; companies with between 1000 and 1500 workers tend to accept corporate social
accountability standards; companies with over 1500 workers demonstrate an active and
positive attitude toward social accountability standards if such measures stabilize the
buyer-supplier relationships. See SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNAT. CORPS., supra
note 8, at 42-43. The All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) also conducted a
study on the conditions of labor protection in Shanghai, Tianjin, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang.
The study shows that private companies above a certain size (100 workers or monthly
revenue of 5 million RMB) have developed beyond the primitive accumulation stage and
actively subject themselves to corporate social accountability standards. However, compa-
nies below that size are still in the primitive accumulation stage, disregarding labor protec-
tion while pursuing profits. See Guanyu feigongyozh qiye zhgong laudong bauhu wenti de
diaoyan baogao [Report on Labor Protection of Non-State-Owned Enterprises] (P.R.C.)
(2005) (released on May 31, 2005 by All China Federation of Trade Unions) (on file with
author).
59 See LI-QING LI & YIAN-LING Li, supra note 28, at 301.
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ruling stratum, rather than in terms of the common people's moral
qualities.6" Mencius, one of the greatest philosophers in Chinese
history stated that division of labor was a necessity.61 He mani-
festly stated that intellectuals should rule and labor should be
ruled.62 Even in today's society, where the concept of the division
of labor has evolved considerably, respect for intellectuals and dis-
regard for laborers are still entrenched in Chinese society.
63
The consumption habits of Chinese consumers may explain
another dimension of the value imperialism implicit in the corpo-
rate social accountability standards established by Western socie-
ties. Currently, in China, the corporate social accountability
standards are primarily implemented in export-oriented compa-
nies.64 The impetus for these companies to adopt social accounta-
bility standards is the demand from buyers. As explained above,
these buyers in turn are pushed by the consumer movements in the
developed markets. Essentially, consumer demand is the cause of
corporate social accountability standards in the global supply
chain. The reason domestic-oriented companies in China are not
affected by the wave of corporate social accountability standards is
that there is no apparent demand from Chinese consumers for such
standards.65 Chinese consumers have long followed the rule of
"live within one's income" and the virtue of thrift.66  They care
more about the physical conditions and functions of products than
about the process through which those products were made.67 Fur-
60 See Edward Shils, Reflections on Civil Society and Civility in the Chinese Intellectual
Tradition, in CONFUCIAN TRADITIONS IN EAST ASIAN MODERNITY 59-60 (Tu Wei-ming
ed., 1996).
61 See Li-QING LI & YIAN-LINO Li, supra note 28, at 301.
62 See id.
63 This may be evidenced by the fact that Chinese students are vigorously pursuing elite
schools and intellectual school performance.
64 See SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNAT. CORPS., supra note 8, at 1-91; LI-QING Li
& YIAN-LING LI, supra note 28, at 184-207.
65 See Zheng Guanghuai, cong xiaofeizhe diaocha kan Zhongguo shehui gongzhong de
fanying [The Chinese Society's Response to Corporate Social Responsibility: A Consumer
Survey], in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNAT. CORPS., supra note 8, 194-209.
66 See LI-QING Li & YIAN-LING LI, supra note 28, at 221.
67 See Douglas A. Kysar, Preference for Process: The Process/Product Distinction and
the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 529 (2004) (referring to "in-
formation regarding the manner in which goods are produced" as process information,
including "the labor conditions of workers who produce a consumer good, the environ-
mental effects of a good's production, the use of controversial engineering techniques such
as genetic modification to create a good, or any number of other social, economic, or envi-
ronmental circumstances that are related causally to a consumer product, but that do not
necessarily manifest themselves in the product itself").
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thermore, since Chinese consumers have long lived under planned
consumption with relatively low consumption rates, the concept of
consumer rights is still new to them.68
IV. RECONSIDERATION OF CORPORATE SOCIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY STANDARDS IN CHINA
A. Protection for Whom?
Similar to the function of corporate social accountability stan-
dards in the global supply chain, the linkage of trade and labor
standards is also often criticized as protectionism. The debate over
whether the WTO should adopt social clauses into its trade agree-
ments may shed some light on whether the protectionist abuse of
the corporate social accountability standards is real. Opponents of
linkage between trade and labor standards suspect the motives of
proponents, in particular unions, and believe such a linkage will
repeat the protectionist experience of the anti-dumping rules.69
However, as shown by Economists Kimberly Ann Elliot and Rich-
ard Freeman, the practices of General System of Preference (GSP)
and trade-labor agreements between the U.S. and other developing
countries evidence that this fear is unfounded.70 If the labor unions
and other interest groups were completely motivated by protec-
tionism, they would focus on cash standards; for example, mini-
mum wages, working hours, and health and safety protection to
immediately slash developing countries' competitiveness. How-
ever, the petitions filed by these groups under GSP have focused
on violation of freedom of association.71 Rather than dictating the
substantive standards of wages and working hours, the groups
leave the decision-making power to workers in developing coun-
tries. Further, if these petitioning labor unions and interest groups
were completely protectionist, they would target large importing
countries that take away their jobs on a ruthlessly large scale. Yet,
the targeted countries under GSP only account for a small portion
of imports. 72 Nevertheless, protectionist motives may not be com-
pletely eliminated. To eliminate protectionism-motivated mea-
68 See LI-QING Li & YIAN-LING Li, supra note 28, at 221-22.
69 See ELLIOT & FREEMAN, supra note 13, at 80-92.
70 See id.
71 See id. at 83.
72 See id. However, note that the reason the large trade partners of the United States,
such as China, are not targeted may be due to complex political and economic com-
promises. Currently, China is not eligible for the U.S. GSP.
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sures, refinements of substantive requirements, procedural
safeguards, and other technical assistance are suggested.73
Currently, incorporation of corporate social accountability
standards into the global supply chain is a voluntary action by mul-
tinational companies rather than a mandate by states. The absence
of direct state measures makes the protectionism arguments unten-
able in the WTO dispute system.
One noteworthy point is that, generally, the proposed linkage
of trade and labor standards is limited to the four core labor rights
recognized by the ILO in 1998,T7 rather than the cash standards.
However, the corporate social accountability standards in the
global supply chain adopted by multinational companies are com-
posed of many cash standards.75 The cash standards carry non-neg-
ligible cost increases in production. This leads us to consider an
important question ? who really benefits and who bears the costs of
the corporate social accountability standards? Within developed
countries, multinational companies typically are not supporters of
protectionism. They can utilize the low-wage labor in developing
countries to sell attractive low-price products. With strong bar-
gaining power, they enjoy an apparently responsible reputation by
shifting the implementation costs of social accountability to their
73 See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 67, at 545 n.62 (summarizing the typologies of process-
based trade measures offered by scholars to reduce protectionist abuse). Although the
typologies are all for environmental measures, they are useful to give some guidance for
labor issues. See Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving
Beyond the Entropic Dilemma, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 625, 645 (2005) (recommending financial
and technical assistance from rich countries to poor countries); see also Frank Emmert,
Labor, Environment Standards and World Trade Law, 10 U.C. DAvis J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
75 (2003) (arguing that substantive labor standards should be based on the ILO Conven-
tions and be prioritized; also arguing for the use of the WTO dispute mechanisms to reduce
protectionist abuse and compensate developing countries).
74 See, e.g., Clyde Summers, The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Standards, and
Societal Values, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 61, 87 (2001) (arguing that "[d]eveloping coun-
tries can retain their legitimate comparative advantages while recognizing at least mini-
mum fundamental values"); Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, Trade Policy & Labor
Standards, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 261, 279 (2005) (arguing that trade sanction should
apply to violation of core labor standards and some generally accepted human rights; e.g.,
genocide, torture, and detention without trial); Daniel S. Ehrenberg, The Labor Link: Ap-
plying The International Trading System to Enforce Violations of Forced and Child Labor,
20 YALE J. INT'L L. 361 (1995).
75 For example, Nike's code of conduct is concerned with minimum wages, benefits,
work hours, and health conditions. See Nikebiz.com, http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/nikebiz.
jhtml?page=25&cat=code (last visited Jan.06, 2007). Wal-Mart's Standards for Suppliers
includes wages, benefits, and work hours. See http://www.walmartstores.com/GlobalWM
StoresWeb/navigate.do?catg=336 (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
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suppliers. Small companies that cannot relocate to developing
countries and unskilled workers who lose jobs to the low-wage
workers in developing countries might gain if the prices of im-
ported products increase, thus making production in developing
countries less competitive. However, since multinational compa-
nies refuse to reflect the cost of working condition improvements
in their imported goods and place the cost on suppliers in develop-
ing countries, unskilled workers in developed countries are un-
likely to benefit. Even if the increased costs for labor protection
(the major costs are abiding by minimum wage laws and overtime
pay laws) would be reflected in product prices, it is unlikely that
the increase would be large enough to close or effectively narrow
the disparity in labor costs between China and developed coun-
tries.76 What's more fundamental is that even if the labor cost in-
creases due to the implementation of corporate social
accountability standards, the manufacture of labor intensive prod-
ucts will not move back to developed countries. Rather, it will
move somewhere else that offers even cheaper labor.77
In developing countries, suppliers are forced to absorb the im-
plementation costs while still being pressured to offer low prices.
Workers in developing countries can gain only if the multinational
companies (the buyers) effectively reward the suppliers, thereby
giving suppliers incentives to honestly improve labor conditions.
However, at least now, this is not the reality. In sum, currently, as
multinational companies adopt corporate social accountability
standards into the global supply chain, those companies obtain rep-
utations of social responsibility without compromising their eco-
nomic interests in low prices. Unskilled labor in developed
countries gains little from such adoption. If the rewards of such
standards are uncertain, suppliers in developing countries can
maintain marginal profits by creating an appearance of social re-
sponsibility. Meanwhile, the workers in developing countries are
76 See LI-QING Li & YAN-LING Li, supra note 28, at 208 (reporting that wages in China
are 1/30-1/50 of wages in developed countries); see also The China Price, BUSINESSWEEK,
Dec. 6, 2004 (reporting that the manufacturing cost in China generally is 30%-50% less
than in the United States and stating that China offers "cheap labor from $120-a-month
production workers to $2000-a-month chip designers").
77 This is evidenced by the fact that labor-intensive companies facing the labor cost
increase in the coastal area of China are moving to the hinterland of China or Vietnam.
See David Barboza, Sharp Labor Shortage in China May Lead to World Trade Shift, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2006, at Al.
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still at the mercy of others.7" It leads us to consider whether work-
ers in developing countries, the intended beneficiary of corporate
social accountability standards in the global supply chain, desire
and need such protection.
Before 2004, China had a seemingly inexhaustible supply of
cheap labor from its rural areas. However, the labor shortage that
has developed in major exporting areas since 2004 may herald the
end of this situation. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security of
China released a report in September 2004 on China's labor
shortages.79 According to the report, labor shortages are occurring
in the major localities of processing industries, particularly affect-
ing shoe, toy, electronics assembly, apparel, and plastic accessories
industries. The labor shortage is also serious for small and medium
sized companies and those companies constrained by low purchase
prices offered by foreign buyers. The major reasons for labor
shortages are low wages and poor working conditions., 0 Wages in
the export-oriented sectors have remained static over the past dec-
78 For example, on April 21 and 23, 2004, there were protests by about two thousand
workers in factories of Stella International Ltd., a shoe supplier of Nike, Reebok, Clarks,
Timberland, and other branded companies. The workers protested the intensified wor-
kload, shortened working hours, and reduced wages. The protest resulted in arrests of
over one thousand workers. All but ten of the arrested workers were released. These ten
workers were prosecuted by the government. They were found guilty of vandalism and
sentenced by a court to imprisonment ranging from 9 months to 3.5 years. However, under
pressure from labor rights organizations and its clients, Stella wrote letters to the court
requesting commutation for the prosecuted workers. The appellate court of the Dong
Guan City overruled the decision by the trial court and found the defenders not guilty on
December 31, 2004. See Xingang xiechang gongren saoluan diaocha [A Report on the
Stella's Workers' Protests], CHINA NEWSWEEK (P.R.C.), Oct. 25, 2004; see also Zongguo
zenfu gaibian panjue shfang xingang shjian beibu gongren [The Chinese Government
Changed the Decision and Released the Workers Arrested in the Stella Event], CHINA LA-
BOR WATCH (P.R.C.), Jan. 1, 2005, available at http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/php/web/
article.php?article_id=158. Note that although Stella's clients, including Nike, Reebok,
and Clark, are praised by many for helping to rescue the workers, the role of these mul-
tinational buyers in this event deserves deeper analysis. Stella's measures (intensifying
workload, shortening working hours, and reducing wages) were a response to these mul-
tinational buyers' socially responsible demand. Stella claimed that it tried to shorten the
working hours (giving two more holidays per month to its workers) in order to be consis-
tent with the trend of corporate social accountability standards in the global supply chain.
However, faced with the price pressure and competition, Stella passed the cost to its work-
ers by shortening the working hours, which aroused protests by the workers. After this
event, it was reported that Stella reverted to its original working hours and wage policies.
79 See MINISTRY OF LABOR AND SOCIAL SECURITY, GUANYU MINGGONG DUANQUE DE
DIAOCHA BAOGAO [REPORT ON LABOR SHORTAGE] (2004); Barboza, supra note 77.
80 See MINISTRY OF LABOR AND SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 79.
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ade despite increased living expenses.81 Meanwhile, wages in rural
areas also have risen over the same period.82 The gap between
wages in the export-oriented areas and rural areas has been nar-
rowing, and workers in rural areas will not migrate unless the
wages in the export-oriented areas are high enough to offer a bet-
ter living. Additionally, the costs of migrating to export-oriented
areas are high under the household registration ("hukou") system
in China.83 Migrant workers are discriminated against by the local
governments in export-oriented areas and have limited access to
the social security system.84 Additionally, local governments have
made it difficult t change registration since they are concerned
about the negative effects of an influx by migrant workers.85
Therefore, if the working conditions subject them to high health
risks, workers are unwilling to take the risk when social security is
unavailable. Workers in developing countries are usually silent re-
garding their rights, particularly in China where freedom of associ-
ation is prohibited. However, Chinese workers have voiced their
anger through their exodus from sweatshops. The labor shortages
in China's export-oriented industries signal the workers' prefer-
ence for corporate social accountability standards. The suppliers
must offer better working conditions in order to retain workers.86
Thus, this creates a dilemma for some low-profit-margin supplier
companies. Their buyers, who have strong bargaining power, re-
fuse to raise purchase prices, while workers, empowered by the
threat of an exodus, demand more perks. Therefore, some suppli-
ers choose to close their factories or relocate to places more abun-
81 See id.
82 See id. The wages in the Pearl River Delta region are less than 510 RMB ($64) per
month.
83 "Hukou" is a system designed to restrict migration from the rural areas to the urban
areas. In the original hukou system established in the 1950s, only urban hukou holders
could receive state-subsidized housing, food, education, medical care, and employment
within the cities; rural hukou holders received no such benefits and protections. Without
these protections, peasants could not survive in the cities and thus were bound to remain in
rural areas. Although there have been some relaxations of the hukou system in the recent
years, migrant workers are forced to file voluminous documents with governments and pay
expensive fees to urban governments in order to retain temporary residency permits. They
are victims of exploitation by urban governments, and their legal status in the urban areas
is capricious. See Xin Frank He, Regulating Rural-Urban Migrants in Beijing: Institutional
Conflict and Ineffective Campaigns, 39 STAN. J. INT'L L. 177 (2003).
84 See id.
85 See id.
86 See Mei Fong, Chinese Puzzle Surprising Shortage of Workers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16,
2004, at BI.
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dant in low-waged labor.87 Other suppliers choose to stay and
provide the wages and benefits that the workers demand, but strug-
gle for profits as a result.88
In sum, multinational companies that voluntarily adopt corpo-
rate social accountability standards in the supply chain are not mo-
tivated by protectionism. Labor unions are not purely
protectionist and might gain little from the adoption. Workers in
China have shown their desire for the standards. Meanwhile, sup-
plier companies in China are not opposed to the standards if the
rewards from being socially responsible are certain. Thus, if the
rewards offered by multinational companies are sufficient, there
would be little resistance to such standards. The pending question
is how to structure effective rewards in the global supply chain.89
B. Immature Supporting Mechanisms
Admittedly, the implementation of corporate social accounta-
bility standards in China has been stained by too much fragmenta-
tion. The inexperience of social auditors and the lack of
standardization make Chinese suppliers think that the adoption of
corporate social accountability standards only creates a lucrative
market for certification and consulting firms exploiting such
change. The undesirable fragmentation and confusion about the
standards can be attributed to the general infancy of social audit-
ing, worldwide, and the chaos of the certification market in China,
specifically.
Since the 1990s, multinational companies have begun to adopt
corporate social accountability standards into the global supply
chain on a large scale. 90 Social auditing and certification services
87 See id. (reporting that many low-margin manufacturers are relocating to China's hin-
terlands or Vietnam for cheap labor); see also Barboza, supra note 77.
88 See Mei Fong, supra note 86 (reporting that a musical toy manufacturer, of which
Wal-Mart is a client, improved its working conditions while struggling for profits); see also
supra notes 47 & 48.
89 See infra Part VI.
90 For example, Reebok adopted Human Rights Protection Standards in 1992. See
http://www.reebok.com/Static/global/initiatives/rights/text-only/business/. That same year,
Wal-Mart developed Standards for Suppliers. See http://www.walmartstores.com/Files/
proxy-2001/page12-proxy.html. The Gap developed Sourcing Guidelines in 1992 as well.
See http://www.gapinc.com/public/SocialResponsibility/sr-fac hist.shtml. In 1997, Mattel
established Global Manufacturing Principles. See Mattel SEC filing DEF 14A, Mar. 26,
1998. In 1998, Adidas adopted Standards of Engagement. See ADIDAS-SALOMON, OUR
WORLD: SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT 2000 at 12 (2000), available at http://www.
corporateregister.com/a10723/asOO-e&s-de.pdf. The SA8000 standard was launched in
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thrive on the rise of these standards. Currently, corporate social
accountability assurance services are primarily provided by quality
certification firms and financial auditing firms, though more and
more NGOs are joining in. For example, most of the certification
bodies accredited by the SAI have well-established reputations and
are experienced in one or more of the following areas: maritime
risk management, product quality certification and testing, envi-
ronmental safety qualifications, and other safety inspections. 91
1997 and revised in 2001. http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&
pageld=473.
91 The certification companies accredited by the SAI, as of September 2007, are ALGI,
BSI, BVQI (Bureau Veritas Quality International), CISE (Centro per l'Innovazione e lo
Sviluppo Economico), CSCC (Cal Safety Compliance Corporation), DNV (Det Norske
Veritas), ITS (Intertek Testing Services), RINA S.P.A (Registro Italiano Navale Group),
SGS-ICS, TUV Asia Pacific Ltd., TUV Rheinland Group, TUV SUD Group, and UL
(Underwriters Laboratories Inc.). See Social Accountability International, http://www.sa-
intl.org/index.cfm'?fuseaction=page.viewpage&pageid=702 (last visited Sept. 4, 2007). BSI,
founded in 1901, now focuses on providing standards and software solutions, and certifying
management systems and products. See About BSI, http://www.bsi-global.com/en/About-
BIS/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2007). BVQI was formed in 1988 in response to the demand for
the independent certification of Quality Management Systems. It primarily provides ser-
vices of management systems certification, product certification, and service certification.
See About Us, http://www.bvqi.com/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2007). DNV, established in
1864, provides services of risk management, certification, and consulting, in particular for
maritime, oil and gas, and process and transportation industries. See About DNV, http://
www.dnv.com/about_us/index.asp (last visited Sept. 4, 2007). Intertek, founded in 1885,
was initially a maritime survey business that evolved to provide testing services. See In-
tertek History, http://www.intertek.com/aboutintertek/intertek-history.shtml/2lang=en
(last visited Sept. 4, 2007). RINA (Registro Italiano Navale), a company established in
1861 in Genova, has been providing ship classification and certification services since its
establishment. See RINA, http://www.rina.it/eng/shipping-classification/shipping-classifi-
cation_certification.asp (last visited Sept. 4, 2007). SGS, originally founded in 1878 in
Rouen as a French grain shipment inspection house and later registered in Geneva in 1919,
provides inspection services of traded goods, product testing services, and certification ser-
vices of products, systems, or services. See About SGS, http://www.sgs.com/about-sgs/in-
brief.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2007). TUV Asia Pacific provides consulting, testing and
servicing activities in technical safety, environmental protection, and the conformity assess-
ment of management systems and products. See TUV NORD Group, http://www.tuv-
nord.com/english/189.asp (last visited Sept. 4, 2007). TUV Rheinland provides product
testing, system assessment, product certification, and consulting and auditing of corporate
social responsibility. See TUV Rheinland Group China, http://www.chn.tuv.com/eng/in-
dex.jsp (last visited Sept. 4, 2007). TUV SUD's "conventional services are periodic vehicle
roadworthiness testing, testing and inspection of industrial plants, product testing, or ex-
pert opinions." About TUV SUD Brief Profile, http://www.tuev-sued.com/about_tuev-
sued/about_us/brief-profile (last visited Sept. 4, 2007). UL primarily provides product test-
ing. See About UL, http://www.ul.com/about/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2007). ALGI was
formed in 1994 by former Labor Department Officers. ALGI is a certification firm that
only provides SA8000 and WRAP product availability certifications. ALGI also provides
security assessment services besides social accountability certification. See A.L.G.I. Ser-
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Historically, such services have been their chief business. Their ex-
pansion of business to labor rights certification is a recent develop-
ment. Although there may be shared auditing principles between
product quality and labor protection, there are certainly significant
differences between them, given the difference in subjects and pur-
poses of the audits. Corporate social accountability standards in
the global supply chain ? in contrast to the centuries-long evolve-
ment of maritime survey certification92 and the decades-long devel-
opment of product quality management,9 3 ? are still in their early
stages and need time for improvement. Advanced and systematic
auditor training and standardization on a sector-specific basis are
needed to improve these standards.
The unregulated certification and consulting market is the rea-
son for the fragmentation in China. This problem is not unique to
social accountability certification. Rather, the chaos is common for
the whole certification and consulting market in China, which is
rife with illegal operations, unauthorized representations, bogus
certifications, and sham auditors.94 Recognizing these problems,
vices, http://www.algi.net/en/cf.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2007). Only ALGI, CISE and
CSCC are companies primarily focusing their business on corporate social accountability
certifications.
92 The maritime survey business can be traced to the 19th century. See supra note 91.
93 The history of product quality management can be traced back to World War II
when the UK Ministry of Defense sent inspectors to its munitions suppliers to supervise
the production process. See JOHN SEDDON, THE CASE AGAINST ISO 9000 at 1 (2d ed.
2000). In 1959, the US government developed Mil-Q-9858a (Quality Program Require-
ment), a quality standards program for military procurement. See id. at 2. By 1962 NASA
had developed "quality system requirements" for its suppliers as well. Id. In 1968, NATO
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization) adopted the AQAP (Allied Quality Assurance Pro-
cedures) for its military procurement. See id. at 3. In 1969 the UK Central Electricity
Generating Board and Ontario Hydro in Canada developed quality assurance standards
for its suppliers. See id. "By this time, the idea of quality assurance had spread beyond the
military." Id. In 1969 a UK committee report on the inspection and assessment of the UK
military quality systems reinforced the need for quality assurance and recommended the
generic standards of quality assurance. See id. at 4. In 1971, the British Standards Institute
(BSI) published the first UK standards, BS 9000, for quality assurance for the electronic
industry. See id. BSI further published BS 5179, Guidelines for Quality Assurance, in 1974
and BS 5750, for common contractual documents of product quality control, in 1979. See
id. at 4-5. In 1987, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) produced the
ISO 9000 series. See id. at 12.
94 Fong-Qing Wang, the former Chair of the CNCA and now the Chair of CNAS,
stated that the certification market has five problems: first, certification services are poor.
Certification firms are charging unreasonable rates, inspecting perfunctorily, issuing certifi-
cates to unqualified clients, and even "trading" certificates. Second, the quality of auditors
is poor. Some of the auditors take personal gifts and benefits from clients. If not satisfied
with the gifts, they even refuse to issue certificates. Third, the conduct of the certification
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the Chinese government established the Certification and Accredi-
tation Administration (CNCA) in 2001 to supervise certification
activities. 95 Later in 2003, the State Council enacted the Certifica-
tion and Accreditation Act. The CNCA, under the authorization
of the Act, promulgated Regulations of the People's Republic of
China on Certification and Accreditation, launching the approval
system and setting codes of conduct for certification firms.96 The
CNCA founded the China Certification and Accreditation Associ-
ation (CCAA) in 2005 as a self-regulating association among the
certification firms.97 The CNCA also established the China Na-
tional Accreditation Service for Conformity Assessment (CNAS)
on March 31, 2006 to approve certification firms, testing laborato-
ries, and inspection institutions.98 Further, the CNCA announced
that crackdowns on illegal certification and consultation services
were the goal of the years 2006 and 2007. 99 Although the certifica-
tion and consulting market will not improve overnight simply be-
cause of these newly established regulations and administrations,
order in the market will be established over time through enforced
regulations and competition among certification firms.
The infancy of social auditing and the disorder of the Chinese
certification market do not undercut the merits of corporate social
accountability standards in the supply chain. These technical
problems can be overcome by improvement in social auditing skills
and the development of certification markets.
firms is unregulated. Fourth, many regulatory agencies are not yet instituted and are not
capable of supervision. Fifth, forward-looking strategies and research are insufficient. See
Renzheng renke hangye qingli menhu [Cleaning the Certification and Accreditation Ser-
vices], ECON. INFO. DAILY (P.R.C.), Nov. 13, 2004.
95 See Certification and Accreditation Administration of the People's Republic of
China, http://www.cnca.gov.cn/cnca/default.shtml (last visited Dec. 15, 2007).
96 See Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Certification and Accredita-
tion (promulgated by the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Sep. 3, 2003,
effective Nov. 1, 2003), available at http://eng.cnas.org.cn/extra/coll/1156832200.pdf
97 See China Certification & Accreditation Association, http://www.ccaa.org.cn/ccaa/
xhjj/8563.shtml (last visited Dec 15, 2007).
98 See China National Accreditation Service for Conformity Assessment, http://eng.
cnas.org.cn/co1678/co1681/article.html?artid=4600 (last visited Dec. 15, 2007).
99 See 2007nian renzheng rengke gongzuo yaodian [The Main Goals of CNCA in 2007],
http://www.cnca.gov.cn/cnca/zwxx/jhgh/ndjh/16671.shtm1; Guanyu yinfa 2006 nian renzheng
rengke gongzuo yaodian [Concerning the Main Goals of CNCA in 2006], http://www.cnca.
gov.cn/cnca/zwxx/jhgh/ndjh/4555.shtml.
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C. A Changing Culture
Cultural difference is a common explanation for resistance to
foreign concepts. However, it is questionable whether traditional
Chinese values make the corporate social accountability standards
incongruent in China.
Even though traditional Chinese society undervalued those
who earned their livelihood by labor, it is open to discussion how
much traditional Chinese values have remained intact under the
half-century rein of Communism, particularly following the Prole-
tarian Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1976. The Chinese
Communist ideology celebrated workers. The Constitution of the
People's Republic of China states that the country is led by the
proletariat and based on the alliance of workers and peasants. 100
Before China opened itself to the rest of the world, the workers
were a powerful political group with strong representation in the
national and local people's congresses, thus influencing policy di-
rections and resource distribution.10 1 The workers participated in
decision making within factories, particularly with regard to wages,
benefits, and bonuses.10 2 Nevertheless, the structure of the Chi-
nese society has dramatically changed since China opened itself up
to the outside world. In order to revive the state-owned enter-
prises, the government gave greater autonomy to management and
took away workers' power over decision making and wage-set-
ting.113 Furthermore, the government adopted a layoff strategy to
boost the state-owned enterprises.10 4 The large-scale layoffs by
state-owned enterprises and the waves of peasants seeking jobs in
cities created an abundant supply of labor and tipped the labor
market in favor of employers. The low social status of the workers
is no surprise given that they are deprived of political power, faced
with competitive markets, and without collective bargaining rights.
100 See Xian Fa art. 1 (1982) (P.R.C.).
101 See DANG DAI ZHONGGUO SHE Hui JIE CENG YAN Jiu BAO GAO [A RESEARCH
REPORT ON SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA] 141 (Xueyi Lu ed., 2002).
102 See id.
103 See JINGLIAN WU, UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING CHINESE ECONOMIC RE-
FORM 139-154 (2005); see also Guang-Jin Chen, Five Waves of Social Mobility in Contem-
porary China, in DANG DAI ZHONGGUO SHE HUI LIU DONG [SOCIAL MOBILITY IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA] 94 (Xueyi Lu ed., 2004), available at http://www.china.com.cn/
zhuanti2005/txt/2004-10/08/content_5674427.htm.
104 The government adopted the layoff strategy in 1995 to revive the state-owned enter-
prises. See Guang-Jin Chen, supra note 103, at 95.
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The change in social status of merchants offers another exam-
ple of the low value traditionally placed on vocations in contempo-
rary China. Traditional Chinese society had a low opinion of
commerce and despised merchants. Confucius and Mencius regard
"merchants as small men because their understanding is focused on
what is profitable."''5 Under the rule of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP), capitalists were deprived of their wealth and control
over businesses.1 °6 Capitalists did not have any rights under the
Constitution.°0 7 However, openness to the world market changed
this structure. In 1988, private enterprises were first formally rec-
ognized through an amendment to the Constitution and the enact-
ment of Provisional Regulations on Private Enterprises.108 With
the government's promotion of economic growth, private entrepre-
neurs in China today have high social status and political
participation. ' 09
Still a more fundamental problem of the cultural resistance ar-
gument is defining "culture." The concept of culture is "suspi-
ciously flexible, maddeningly ambiguous, and ultimately
elusive."' 10 "Culture may instead represent a response to external
conditions and change as those conditions change."'' "Behind so
many cultural attitudes, tastes, and preferences lie the political and
105 See Shils, supra note 60, at 55, 59-60 (inferring that "for Confucius the only proper
way to acquire wealth was to inherit it or to have it bestowed by the ruler").
106 Beginning in 1953, the CCP started its state ownership policy. The policy was imple-
mented in two stages. Before 1955, an enterprise was structured in the form of co-opera-
tion by the state and private owners. The private owners could participate in profit
distribution. Between 1955 and the end of 1956, the private owners only had rights to
stated interests and did not have rights to profit distribution. After that, the private own-
ers no longer had rights to stated interest. See Guang-Jin Chen, supra note 103, at 46.
107 Note that capitalists were defined politically. See id. at 59.
108 See Xian Fa art. 11, (1982) (P.R.C.); see also Guang-Jin Chen, The Formation of the
Stratum of Private Entrepreneur, in DANG DAI ZHONGGUO SHE HUI LIU DONG [SOCIAL
MOBILITY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA] 243-44 (Xueyi Lu ed., 2004).
109 See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 197
(2002) (reporting that "[m]ore business owners are becoming members of the people's
congresses and the Chinese Political Consultative Committee ... [and] over 15% of private
enterprises owners are Party members."); see also Guang-Jin Chen, supra note 108, at
241-65 (surveys of the economic, educational, and political backgrounds of the Chinese
private entrepreneurs show expanding economic power, elitism, and active political
participation).
I10 See Frank B. Cross, Law and Economic Growth, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1737, 1757 (2002)
(quoting Peter H. Schuck, Perpetual Motion, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1738, 1745 (1997)).
111 See id. at 1758.
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economic forces that shaped them. "112 As explained above, the
contemporary institutional environment is dramatically different
from that of traditional Chinese society. The weight of traditional
values must be analyzed carefully.
In sum, at least the current downward movement in workers'
status in China is more the result of institutional change and mar-
ket forces than a legacy of values in traditional Chinese society.
D. Potential Benefits: Sustainable Economic Growth
For the Chinese government and companies to truthfully ac-
cept corporate social accountability standards, it is necessary to do
more than just refute negative concerns. One must also show that
such standards will have positive effects. However, one should be
careful to avoid value imperialism when analyzing potential bene-
fits. Positive contributions should be evaluated from the perspec-
tive of China itself rather than from the perspective of western
countries.
China is zealously promoting economic growth.' 13 Therefore,
if there is a strong correlation between corporate social accounta-
bility standards and economic growth, the standards may be easily
accepted in China out of self-interest. Corporate social accounta-
bility standards can contribute to sustainable economic growth in
at least three ways: alleviation of inequality, dependence on the
global market, and creation of accessible and predicable invest-
ment environments.
1. Alleviation of Inequality
China has developed economically at an unprecedented pace
over the last two decades.1 1 4 Simultaneous with this economic
growth, there has been a drastic reduction in poverty levels. 115
112 See id. (quoting HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 239-40 (2000)).
113 See Zhonghua RenMin Gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan di sh yi ge wu
nian guihua gangyao [The Guidelines of the 11th Five-Year Plan on National Economic
and Social Development of the People's Republic of China], available at http://www.gov.
cn/ztzl/2006-03/16/content_228841.htm, for a brief English version, see http://www.china.
org.cn/english/features/guideline/156529.htm.
114 According to the World Bank, average annual GDP growth between 1986 and 2006
was 9%. See China at a Glance, http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/chn-aag.pdf (last vis-
ited Dec 10, 2007).
115 "[T]he number of people living in poverty (under $ 1 per day) fell from 634 million in
1981 to 212 million in 2001." WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006: EQ-
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However, economic development has also brought an increase in
inequality. 116 It is believed by some that inequality is an inevitable
price for economic development. However, the view that develop-
ment requires a trade-off between poverty and inequality has been
refuted by empirical studies on China.117 Inequality is an impedi-
ment to further poverty reduction. In addition, the unrest among
the poor has increased greatly in recent years due to disgruntle-
ment about inequality.1 18 This unrest has caused concern among
investors.119
Not only are the poor, unskilled workers deserting the sweat-
shops, but a growing number of the well-off urbanites are seeking
jobs in state-owned enterprises rather than in private companies.12 °
People are looking for job security and social benefits.1 2 1 Private
companies in China notoriously do not provide insurance or pen-
UITY AND DEVELOPMENT 122 (2005), available at http://www.worldbank.org (follow "Data
& Research" hyperlink; then follow "Research" hyperlink; then follow "World Develop-
ment Reports" hyperlink).
116 See, e.g., Ximing Wu & Jeffrey M. Perloff, China's Income Distribution over Time:
Reasons for Rising Inequalities, (Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, U.
Cal. Berkeley CUDARE Working Papers, Paper No. 977, 2004), available at http://reposi-
tories.cdlib.org/are-ucb/977; see also To Each According to His Abilities, THE ECONOMIST,
Jun. 2, 2001.
117 See Martin Ravallion, A Poverty-Inequality Trade-Off? 14 (World Bank Dev. Res.
Group, Working Paper No. 3579, 2005), available at http://econ.worldbank.org (follow
"Research" hyperlink; then follow "Working Papers" hyperlink) (finding that in China
"the periods of more rapid growth did not bring more rapid increases in inequality; indeed,
the periods of falling inequality (1981-85 and 1995-98) had the highest growth in average
household income," and "the provinces that saw a more rapid rise in rural inequality saw
less progress against poverty, not more"); see also Martin Ravallion & Shaohua Chen,
China's (Uneven) Progress Against Poverty 4 (World Bank Dev. Res. Group, Working Pa-
per No. 3408, 2004), available at http://econ.worldbank.org (follow "Research" hyperlink;
then follow "Working Papers" hyperlink) ("At the outset of China's current transition pe-
riod, levels of poverty were so high that inequality was not an important concern," but
"more unequal provinces will face a double handicap in future poverty reduction; they will
have lower growth and poverty will respond less to that growth.").
118 See Kathy Chen, Free Market Rattles Chinese, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2006, at A9 ("Ac-
cording to Chinese police, 74,000 mass protests involving more than 100 people each oc-
curred in 2004, compared with fewer than 10,000 a year in the mid-1990s.").
119 See Jason Dean, China's Violent Protestors Worry Some Investors, WALL ST. J., Jan
18, 2006, at A9 (demonstrators in Guangdong were demanding more compensation be-
cause land was taken from them to build a factory, but the more profound reason for the
rise protests is social unrest due to the widening gap between the poor and the rich, leaving
the poor disgruntled).
120 See Chen, supra note 118.
121 See id.
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sion plans.122  The well-off urbanites cannot handle the medical
risks and expenses without the social benefits; surely the poor mi-
grant workers are not equipped for these challenges either. The
avoidance of providing benefits by private companies harms eco-
nomic growth, since the driving force of economic growth in China
should be the lively private companies rather than the sluggish
state-owned enterprises.
Corporate social accountability standards, accompanied by
private monitoring mechanisms, may alleviate the tension sur-
rounding the issue of inequality in Chinese society by ensuring that
companies provide minimum wages, insurance, pensions, and other
labor protection. In addition to creating a stable investment envi-
ronment, corporate social accountability standards can help ex-
pand the middle-class, which would be propitious for the upgrading
of all industries supported by the Chinese government, from labor-
focused to knowledge-based industries.
123
2. Dependence on the Global Market
Trade is an important reason for the remarkable economic
growth in China. With its accession to the WTO, China has be-
122 According to a report released by the government of the Hunan Province, 397 of the
731 surveyed private enterprises in Hunan did not provide any pension insurance for their
employees, accounting for 54.3% of all the surveyed companies in the year of 2003. Only
140 companies (19.2%) provided pension insurance for all of their employees. Of the
195,000 employees in the surveyed companies, only 70,000 (35.9%) were covered by pen-
sion insurance. However, in the same year, 96% of employees in state-owned enterprises
nationwide were covered by pension insurance. See SUN QIXIANG ET AL, ZHONGGUO SHE
HUI BAO ZHANG ZHI DU YAN JUI SHE HUI BAO XIAN GUI GE YU SHANG YE BAO SIAN FA
ZHAN [CHINA SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM RESEARCH] 41 (2005). Also, the Department of
Statistics of the Guangdong province conducted a survey in 2002 on pension insurance in
600 private enterprises. The surveyed companies were subdivided into three types: domes-
tic companies, companies owned by investors from Hong Kong, Macau, or Taiwan, and
companies owned by foreigners. Of the 226 domestic companies, 192 provided pension
insurance and the percentage of the 226 companies' employees covered by pension insur-
ance was 39.1%. Of the 209 companies owned by investors from Hong Kong, Macau, or
Taiwan, 191 provided pension insurance, and the percentage of the 209 companies' em-
ployees covered was 48.6%. 155 of the 165 companies owned by foreigners provided pen-
sion insurance and the percentage of their employees covered was 57.3%. See Zhao
Qiong, Guanyu gqiye shehui zeren de duihua [About Conversation of Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility], ECON. DAILY (P.R.C.), Feb.14, 2004.
123 See Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China, The Educational De-
velopment During the 10th 5-Year Plan and the Plans for the 11th 5-Year Plan, Feb. 28,
2006, available at http://www.moe.edu.cn/edoas/website18/info18515.htm (addressing in-
dustry restructuring and promoting technology development and education) (last visited
Mar. 22, 2007).
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come more integrated into the global economy.'24 This integration
means not only that China has the power to affect the global mar-
ket, but also that China has to adjust itself to the market. Sensitiv-
ity to demand in foreign markets is necessary to survive in the
competition. The United States and the EU are the major export
markets for China.125 The consumer preferences in these markets
"may be heavily influenced by information regarding the manner
in which goods are produced.''126 There is a trend that the consum-
ers in these markets demand products made in a socially responsi-
ble way. 127 If China as a seller does not satisfy consumer demands,
other competitors will take over its market share.128 To retain its
global market share and sustain economic growth, China has to
adapt to market demand.
3. Creation of Fair, Accessible, and Predicable
Investment Environments
Advocates of the law and economic development theory hold
that law is an important pillar of economic growth. This theory
basically asserts that without the law providing property rights and
enforcing contracts, people will not invest because they will not be
able to capture the return from their investment.129 Without such
legal provisions transactions will be limited to the short-term. Im-
personal transactions with third-party enforcement are essential for
modern economic growth.'30 A number of empirical studies have
shown that law is necessary though not sufficient for economic de-
124 See NAT'L BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA, STATISTICAL COMMUNIQU9 OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE 2005 NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOP-
MENT VI (2006), available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcomingevents/t200603
02_402308116.htm (reporting that the value of exports increased from $266.1 billion in
2001 to $762 billion in 2005).
125 See id.
126 Kysar, supra note 67, at 529.
127 See id.
128 See HALINA WARD, WORLD BANK GROUP, PUBLIC SECTOR ROLES IN STRENGTHEN-
INC CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: TAKING STOCK 14 (2004), available at http://
www.ifc.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/CSR-Taking-Stock.pdf/$FILE/CSR-
Taking_Stock.pdf ("Cambodia now accepts that its textile industry cannot compete with
China simply on the basis of [labor] input costs. Instead, the country is seeking to position
itself as a location for 'responsible' purchasing.").
129 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 5
(1981) ("the model assumes an incentive structure that will allow individuals to capture the
returns to society of investment").
130 See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 35 (1990).
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velopment.311 At first glance, though, China seems to be a counter
proof to the law and economic development theory. China has ex-
perienced remarkable economic growth despite its weak legal sys-
tem. China's great economic performance has been attributed to
cultural factors and informal alternatives to law. Under the weak
legal system, economic participants have relied on extended family
relationships, guilds, clan groups, 13 2 and client-like relationships
with governmental officials to conduct their business.133 However,
this kind of relational capitalism has its limits for further economic
development in China. First, such relational capitalism occurs
among the Chinese themselves and other overseas Chinese. For-
eign investors are unlikely to penetrate cultural and language barri-
ers and establish the necessary relationships. 134 As opposed to the
general accessibility of law, Chinese relational capitalism is essen-
tially an investment barrier to foreign investors, even though for-
eign investment is important for China's further economic
development.1 35 Second, the relational capitalism, or "rule of rela-
tionships," does not "prevent the imposition of externalities on
outsiders."'1 36  Environmental pollution1 37 and labor exploitation
causing social unrest are the costs of economic development.
Third, the relational capitalism creates more opportunities for cor-
ruption and disfavors "the companies that are more economically
efficient but lack the proper connections.'" 138
The Chinese government has recognized the importance for
economic growth of having a strong legal system. This recognition
is evidenced by declarations of Chinese policymakers; by mass leg-
islations, e.g., labor laws; and by the reforms in the legal profession
131 See PEERENBOOM, supra note 109, at 458-62 (summarizing the empirical studies
finding the correlation between the rule of law and economic development).
132 See Tom Ginsburg, Does Law Matter for Economic Development? Evidence from
East Asia, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 829, 829-35 (2000) (book review).
133 See PEERENBOOM, supra note 109, at 466.
134 See id. at 476 (explaining that in order to obtain the benefits of relationships, foreign
investors would choose to partner with Chinese businesses by forming joint ventures).
135 See id. at 477 (stating that "[foreign investment enterprises] employ 10% of the non-
agriculture work force, generate over 20% of total national industrial output, and account
for over 48% of all trade"... [and] "[b]y some estimates, China needs 3.0 to 4.2% of GDP
just to bail out banks, another 2 to 5% of GDP annually to clean up the environment, plus
an additional US$744 billion, or about 8 to 9% of GDP annually, for electric power, tele-
communications, transportation, water, and sanitation infrastructure projects").
136 Id. at 467.
137 See id.
138 See id. at 472; see also Ginsburg, supra note 132, at 850.
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and in education. 139 Corporate social accountability standards can
contribute to economic growth by improving the enforcement of
laws and creating rule-based investment environments.
Compliance with law is the fundamental requirement of all
corporate social accountability standards. These standards tend to
address the same items already broadly regulated by the Labor
Law of the People's Republic of China.14 ° In spite of the overlap-
ping substance of such standards and China's labor laws, resistance
to the standards has emerged. This resistance highlights the lack of
enforcement of the laws on the books in China. The explanations
for the lack of enforcement vary depending on context. In the con-
text of the labor laws, the explanation may be due to the lack of
clarity of the law, a paucity of administrative resources, or
corruption.
Although the Chinese government has promulgated numerous
laws since it opened up the markets,141 the quality of the laws is
poor. The laws are poorly drafted, excessively broad, vague, incon-
sistent, and opaque.142 The reasons for the poor quality include
unclear separation of powers and inexperience of the drafters,
which arguably provides discretion in implementation to local gov-
ernments to adjust to local situations. 43 The poor quality of the
laws undermines certainty and predictability, increases costs for in-
vestors, and creates opportunities of corruption for officials. 144
139 See Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43, 111
(2001).
140 For example, SA8000 addresses child labor, forced labor, health and safety, freedom
of association and rights to collective bargaining, discrimination, discipline, working hours,
compensation, and management systems. Article 15 of China's Labor Law prohibits hiring
persons under the age of 16. Article 17 and Article 32(2) addresses voluntary employment
relationship. Article 52 requires employer set up health and safety protection for employ-
ees. Article 7 states that employees have rights to participate and establish unions. Article
8 deals with collective bargaining. Article 12 bans discrimination. Article 36 states that the
working hours must not exceed 8 hours per day and 44 hours per week. Article 41 states
that the overtime must not exceed 3 hours per day or 36 hours per month. Article 48 and
49 set forth the minimum wages. Labor Law of the People's Republic of China (promul-
gated by the President of the People's Republic of China, July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1,
1995), available at http://trs.molss.gov.cn/was40/mainframe.htm.
141 See Peerenboom, supra note 109, at 239 ("More than 350 laws and 6,000 lower-level
regulations have been passed since 1978.").
142 See id. at 247-58 (explaining why the quality of the PRC's laws is poor).
143 See id.
144 See id., at 251; see also Tong Xing, Quanqiuhua xia zongguo laudong zhdu bianqian
de guiji [The Track of the Changes of Chinese Labor System under Globalization], in So-
CIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNAT. CORPS., supra note 8, at 186-87 (reporting about an
interview with a director of the CSR department of Nike who stated that the unclear laws
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Corporate social accountability standards can serve as a supple-
mentary guide on how to implement the laws and regulations of
labor protection in China. Through the gradual implementation of
corporate social accountability standards in the global supply
chain, the government can study approaches to the issue of corpo-
rate social responsibility. That the government is learning is evi-
denced by its recent measures, discussed below.
Lack of administrative resources is another reason for the
non- or under-enforcement of labor laws. The number of labor
protection supervisors falls short of the desired amount.145 Thus,
corporate social accountability standards structured with verifica-
tion systems can assist the government's administration of the la-
bor laws. Moreover, since the standards are monitored by
multinational companies and private or non-governmental certifi-
cation bodies rather than local governments, whether the laws are
enforced won't be at the discretion of the local officials. The in-
vestment environment will be shaped more by international mar-
ket rules than the opportunistic local officials.
V. RESOLUTION
A. The Attitude of China's Central Government
In the 1990s, the central and local levels of the Chinese gov-
ernment were passive with regard to corporate social accountabil-
ity standards. The government's awareness of corporate social
accountability standards was triggered by the media hype in the
years after 2003.146 As shown below, the central government
places the issue far beyond the limited scope of setting social ac-
countability standards for export-oriented industries. Rather, the
government frames the issue in a broader context of corporate so-
cial responsibility for all companies.
1. Recognition of Corporate Social Responsibility
in Recent Legislation
In 1993, the People's Republic of China first promulgated its
Company Law, which took effect on July 1, 1994. The concept of
are an obstacle to implementation of corporate social responsibility for its suppliers in
China).
145 The ratio of workers to labor rights administrators in China should be 8000:1, but is
currently 25,000:1. See LI-QING Li & YAN-LING Li, supra note 28, at 154.
146 See supra note 10.
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corporate social responsibility was partly embedded in this law.
The purpose of the 1994 Company Law was to protect the legal
rights and interests of companies, shareholders, and creditors and
to promote the development of the socialist markets. 147 The pur-
pose of a company was set forth in Article 5, which addressed the
economic nature and profit orientation of a company. Article 5
required that a company with its own assets "operate indepen-
dently and be responsible for its own profits and losses."'148 It also
required that a company, "under the macro-adjustment and control
of the State, organize its production and operation independently
in accordance with market demand for the purpose of raising eco-
nomic benefits and labor productivity and maintaining and increas-
ing the value of its assets."' 49 The 1994 Company Law further
required, in Article 14, that a company "abide by the law, observe
professional ethics, strengthen the development of socialist culture
and ideology, and subject itself to supervision by the government
and the public."'5 ° Article 14 can be interpreted as the overarching
rule for corporate social responsibility. Under Article 14, a com-
pany must not only comply with law but also observe business eth-
ics. Moreover, a company is subject not only to the supervision of
the government but also of the public. Public supervision may be
understood to include supervision by consumers, communities, in-
vestors, and other stakeholders. 51
The 1994 Company Law also placed much emphasis on labor
protection, including employee training, safety in production,
union, consultation, and representation on supervisory boards. It
required that a company protect the legal rights and interests of its
147 Company Law of People's Republic of China (promulgated by Presidential Order of
the People's Republic of China, Dec. 29, 1993, effective July 1, 1994) P.R.C. LAws, art. 1,
available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/china.company.law.1993/doc#3 (hereinafter 1994
Company Law).
148 Id. at art. 5.
149 Id. at art. 5.
150 Id. at art. 14. In Chinese, Vl/Lg [professional ethics] usually describes the notion
of doing business in a manner consistent with the moral rules in the profession. For exam-
ple, a lawyer is required to follow the rules of professional responsibility. The usage of the
term seldom applies to companies. For companies, the common usage is MR, i4ft. [busi-
ness ethics]. Therefore, the usage in the 1994 Company Law is improper. It was corrected
in the 2005 Company Law.
151 See Jun-Hai Liu, Qianghua gongsi shehui zeren de fali skau ji lifa jianyi [The Legal
Justifications and Legislative Suggestions for Strengthening Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity], in KUAGUo GONGSI DE SHEHUI ZEREN YU ZHONGGUO SHEHUI [SOCIAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS & THE CHINESE SOCIETY] 147 (Tan Shen & Liu
Kaiming eds., 2003).
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employees, strengthen labor protection, and realize safe produc-
tion.152 It stated that a company's workers "shall, in accordance
with the law, organize a trade union to carry out the trade union
activities" and protect the lawful rights and interests of workers. 153
A company also had to provide its trade union with the conditions
necessary for carrying out its activities. 154  Wholly state-owned
companies and limited liability companies invested or established
by two or more state-owned enterprises should, through workers'
congresses or other forms, "practice democratic management in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the Constitution and relevant
laws."1 55 The 1994 Company Law also required that a company
hear the opinions of workers and invite worker representatives to
the related meetings when deciding upon matters that affected
workers' interests, such as wages, benefits, production safety, and
labor insurance.156 The emphasis on labor rights is a reflection of
the socialist ideology under the rein of CCP. Although labor pro-
tection is only an element of corporate social responsibility,'157 it is
the core of corporate social accountability standards, such as
SA8000. Thus, the concept of corporate social responsibility was
partly embodied in the 1994 Company Law, although the term so-
cial responsibility was absent. However, this indirect approach was
changed by the 2006 Company Law. 158
In 2005, the Chinese government overhauled the 1994 Com-
pany Law. The new version of the Company Law took effect on
152 1994 Company Law, supra note 147, at art. 15.
153 Id. at art. 16.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at arts. 55, 121.
157 Other aspects of corporate social responsibility may include environmental protec-
tion, human rights protection, consumer protection, anti-corruption, etc.
158 Professor Jun-Hai Liu, the first law professor promoting corporate social responsibil-
ity in China, argued that two purposes of a company were laid out in the 1993 Company
Law: making profits (Article 5) and being socially responsible (mainly Article 14). Article
14 constrained Article 5. Since Article 5 defined the purpose of a company, the 1993 Com-
pany Law could be misconstrued as not treating corporate social responsibility as a pur-
pose of a company. For clarification, Professor Jun-Hai Liu suggested that corporate social
responsibility should be explicitly stated in Article 1 or in Article 5. At the time of the
enactment of the 1993 Law, the importance of corporate social responsibility was down-
played against a background of helping state-owned enterprises shirk debt, the dominance
of a laissez-faire point of view, hastiness in legislation, and a lack of well-developed corpo-
rate social responsibility research in western countries. See Jun-Hai Liu, supra note 151.
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January 1, 2006.159 In the 2006 Company Law, Article 5 states, "a
company shall comply with the laws and administrative regulations,
social morality and business morality. It shall act in good faith, ac-
cept the supervision of the government and the general public, and
bear social responsibilities."'160 The term "social responsibilities" is
clearly articulated in Article 5.16 In addition to preserving the la-
bor protections of the 1994 Company Law, the 2006 Company Law
strengthens them by obligating companies to enter into formal la-
bor contracts with their employees.162 The economic purpose of a
company stated in Article 5 of the 1994 Company Law was com-
pletely removed, but this removal does not mean that making prof-
its is no longer a purpose of a company. Article 1 of the 2006
Company Law preserves and enshrines the economic purpose by
protecting the rights and interests of companies and sharehold-
ers. 1 63 In sum, the 2006 Company Law unequivocally makes it
clear that companies must maintain corporate social responsibility
in the course of pursuing profits.
In addition to the generally applicable 2006 Company Law,
the China Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated the
Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China
("the Code") in 2002.164 The Code essentially requires the listed
companies in China to consider stakeholder interests in their cor-
porate decisions. The stakeholder section of the Code165 states that
a listed company shall respect the interests of "banks and other
creditors, employees, consumers, suppliers, the community, and
other stakeholders."'' 66 Moreover, "[a] listed company shall ac-
tively cooperate with its stakeholders" to advance a sustainable
and healthy development of the company.1 61 In addition, "[a] com-
pany shall provide the necessary means to ensure the legal rights of
159 Company Law of People's Republic of China (promulgated by Presidential Order of
the People's Republic of China, Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) P.R.C. LAWS, available
at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2006-04/17/content_569258.htm.
[60 Id. at art. 5 (emphasis added).
161 Id.
162 Id. at art. 17.
163 Id. at art. 1.
164 Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China (promulgated by the
China Securities Regulatory Commission, State Economic and Trade Commission, Jan. 7,
2001), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/code-en.pdf [hereinafter the
Code].
165 The Code explicitly and unambiguously uses the term "stakeholders." Id. at ch. 6.
166 Id. at art. 81.
167 Id. at art. 82.
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the stakeholders.''168 Further, when the rights and interests of the
stakeholders are harmed, the stakeholders shall have opportunities
and channels for redress.' 69 A listed company also shall encourage
its employees to express their opinions with regard to important
decisions about corporate operations, financial conditions, and em-
ployee benefits "through direct communications with the board of
directors, the supervisory board and the management."' 70 A listed
company, while maintaining its sustainable development and maxi-
mizing shareholder interests, shall pay attention to "the welfare,
environmental protection of public interests of the community in
which it resides, and shall pay attention to the company's social
responsibilities."'171 The preamble of the Code states that a listed
company shall reflect the Code in its articles and bylaws. The Code
is the major measure of whether a listed company has a good cor-
porate governance structure. The Securities Regulatory Commis-
sion may instruct a listed company with significant problems in its
corporate governance to overhaul its governance in accordance
with the Code.'72
The 2006 Company Law and the Code are consistent with the
spirit of corporate social accountability standards. Both the Com-
pany Law and the Code require companies to consider stakehold-
ers' interests in their operation, particularly employees' interests.
The 2006 Company Law has great impact on all companies in
China. Typically corporate social accountability standards have
been implemented in export-oriented companies only. Domestic-
oriented companies have been less exposed to these standards be-
cause of a lack of awareness in the domestic market. However,
since the 2006 Company Law applies to all companies, whether ex-
port- or domestic-oriented, they have to embrace corporate social
responsibility in their operations. Thus, corporate social accounta-
bility standards now have a statutory basis that has to be incorpo-
rated into every business operation in China.
168 Id. at art. 83.
169 Id.
170 Id. at art. 85.
171 Id. at art. 86 (referencing the phrase "company's social responsibilities").
172 See id. at Preface.
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2. The Progression of Corporate Social Accountability
Standards in China
There is growing demand in China to develop its own corpo-
rate social accountability standards. The demand is driven by rec-
ognition of corporate social responsibility and is also a defense
against the imposition of western standards. 173 The movement in
China towards corporate social accountability standards can be
seen in three types of regulations: company law, labor law, and
stand-alone corporate social accountability standards.
As mentioned above, the 2006 Company Law explicitly recog-
nizes corporate social responsibility. Besides the Company Law,
which provides the broad guidelines for corporate conduct, labor
laws specify labor rights and dispute mechanisms. Although the
emergence of corporate social accountability standards in the
global supply chain is a response to states' failure to effectively
control misconduct by multinational companies, it does not belittle
the importance of national labor law. Compliance with law is the
core content of corporate social accountability standards. The
specificity of law can provide clear guidelines for compliance and
enforcement and more harmonized standards. Accordingly, how
to improve the protections offered by labor laws has always been a
focus in discussions about corporate social responsibility in China.
In the recent years, the Chinese government has promulgated
many laws and rules on labor protection; for example, labor unem-
ployment insurance, prohibition of child labor, minimum wages,
and collective employment contracts. However, the effectiveness
of these new laws and the enforcement of them by the government
need to be examined closely.
Stand-alone corporate social accountability standards are
deemed to be a direct countermeasure to Western standards, such
as SA8000. The State Council approved a proposal that mandated
173 For example, Zhuo-Hui Liu, the Vice Chairman of CNCA, stated that SA8000 is not
suitable for the situation in China and that the CNCA currently has no plans to adopt any
social accountability standards established by any foreign countries or international organi-
zations. Social accountability certification deserves discussion in China only when China's
own social accountability standards are available. See SA8000 Ren zheng bu sh h zhong-
guo guo qing [SA8000 Certification Does Not Suit the Situation in China], CHINA BUSINESS
HERALD (P.R.C.), Jan. 21, 2005. Also, Yu-Ling Ren, Counsellor of the State Council, has
said that China has to speed up its research and establish its own corporate social account-
ability standards in order to prevent that China will be constrained by the standards set up
by the western countries. See Le-Zhen Huang, Qiye gongming yundong [Corporate Citi-
zenship Movement], CHINA ECON. WEEKLY (P.R.C.), Oct. 24, 2005.
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the Ministry of Commerce, in cooperation with seven other minis-
tries, to enact Chinese corporate social accountability standards.1 7 1
Although this general set of corporate social accountability stan-
dards is not yet available, corporate social accountability standards
still are being realized in government policies. For example, since
2005, the Ministry of Commerce has declared that in order to be
eligible for export quota bids of certain minerals a company must
provide its employees with labor and other social insurances paid
for in full by the company.1 75
Furthermore, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange released the So-
cial Responsibility Guidelines for Listed Companies in September
2006.176 These Guidelines sets forth basic standards for a listed
company on how to interact with its stakeholders, including share-
holders, creditors, employees, suppliers, consumers, and the com-
munity where it is located. It also suggests that a list company may
on a voluntary basis release a social responsibility report periodi-
cally. The social responsibility report may address corporate social
responsibility measures, systems, implementation conditions, rea-
sons for non- or under- implementation, and corrective measures.
B. The Attitude of Local Governments
Since Chinese local governments are eager for local develop-
ment and also compete with each other, they have shown mixed
attitudes toward corporate social accountability standards.177 The
governments in the areas abundant with labor-intensive industries,
174 The Chinese corporate social accountability standards were expected to be formally
released in 2007. Currently, however, the charged ministries have still not completed the
standards. This information was obtained by the author through personal contact with
staff members in the Ministry of Commerce).
175 See Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China Department on For-
eign Trade, http://big5.mofcom.gov.cn/gate/big5/wms.mofcom.gov.cn/static/column/zcfb/g.
html/1 (last visited Apr. 21, 2006).
176 See Shenzhen zhengjuan jiaoyisuo shanshi gongsi shehui zeren zhiyin [Social Respon-
sibility Guidelines for Companies Listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange], available at http://
www.szse.cn/main/rule/jysywgz/fxywgz/200609259300.shtml (last visited Nov.10, 2007).
177 A survey was conducted by the Contemporary China Research Center of Tsinghua
University and the Shenzhen Contemporary Society Observation Center in 2001. The re-
searchers interviewed two hundred local officials in the provinces of Guangdong, Hunan,
Anhui, Jiangsu, and Shanghai City. Most of the local officials did not know about the
codes of conduct. After research team members informed them of the codes' meanings,
however, the local officials, except those in Guangdong, believed the corporate social ac-
countability codes would be beneficial to society. Officials from Guangdong, which is a
major locus of processing and assembly industries and accounts for more than one-third of
China's export value, were concerned about the likelihood of factories moving away from
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such as Guangdong, have traditionally been skeptical about the
adoption of corporate social accountability standards and are con-
cerned about the negative impact such standards could have on lo-
cal industries.'78 However, their skepticism and concern seem to
be overcome by the global trend toward corporate social accounta-
bility standards and the numerous labor disputes of recent years.
179
Shenzhen, a city packed with labor-intensive industries in
Guangdong, is now considering promulgating corporate social ac-
countability standards in response to external pressure from the
global market and the internal pressure created by intense employ-
ment disputes.18 °
The Hunan government declared that, on January 2006, it be-
gan to conduct a large-scale survey of the situation of corporate
social accountability standards implemented in companies and that
it would to help companies to obtain SA8000 certifications.' 81
C. The Private Sector Response
Currently, companies in China have mixed attitudes toward
corporate social accountability standards. There is no mystery be-
hind these mixed views. The decision of whether to implement
corporate social accountability standards is based on a benefit-cost
calculation. The suppliers that have positive attitudes toward such
standards are those who have gained committed buyer relation-
ships.182 The suppliers that question the standards have not seen
the benefits from the implementation of the standards.1 83 How-
ever, for the time being there seems to be a consensus among the
suppliers in China that high production costs and egregious viola-
Guangdong to other areas with lower labor costs. See SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANS-
NAT. CORPS., supra note 8, at 60-63.
178 See id.
179 The number of labor disputes accepted by labor and social security agencies nation-
wide was 47,951 in 1996. The number increased to 226,391 in 2003. See Ministry of Labour
and Social Security, P.R.C., Labour Disputes Accepted and Settled, available at http://www.
molss.gov.cn/gb/zwxx/2005-12/02/content_95346.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
180 See Qiye shehui zheren jiang you Shenzhen biaozhun [Shenzhen Will Establish Cor-
porate Social Responsibility Standards], Oct. 31, 2006, http://www.shenzhen.molss.gov.cn/
main/Web/Article/2006/10/31/0934550558C20400.aspx (last visited Jan. 06, 2007).
181 See Hunan qidong SA8000 renzheng chukuo qiye mianlin shehui zheren kauyan [Hu-
nan Initiates SA8000 Certification, Exporting Companies Faced with Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility Challenges], available at http://www.hunan.gov.cn/sy/zwxy/zwdt/200606/t200606
24_32372.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
182 See SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNAT. CORPS., supra note 8, at 43.
183 See JORGENSEN ET AL., supra note 52, at 27-29.
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tions of labor rights can put them out of business. When the price
is too high, there is no buyer. When the labor standards are too
low, there is no buyer either. While the general positive relation-
ship between creating stable buyer relationships and good corpo-
rate social responsibility has not been established in China, the
probability of losing business and employees due to sub par labor
standards is recognized by the suppliers. The suppliers are trying
to strike a balance between maximizing profits and providing ac-
ceptable labor standards.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to implement corporate social accountability stan-
dards effectively and efficiently, the external pressure must be
transformed into internal values. The attitudes of suppliers, con-
sumers, and workers in China are crucial. The suppliers in China
have resisted the standards primarily because increased costs may
hurt profits. The Chinese consumers, who should be the impetus
for such standards, are absent. The Chinese workers, who are the
intended beneficiaries, are ignorant of their rights. Helping these
key players to dispel their concerns and recognize their rights is
important.
A. Effective Rewards and Harmonization
As mentioned above, the corporate social accountability stan-
dards in the global supply chain abound with cash standards. This
indicates that implementation of corporate social accountability
standards requires non-negligible costs. Presently, the multina-
tional companies do not bear the large portion of the implementa-
tion costs, though they usually bear the costs of external or internal
auditing. Rather, their suppliers in developing countries shoulder
the costs of improving working conditions required by the stan-
dards. This cost allocation may be explained by multinational com-
panies' strong bargaining power and suppliers' direct control over
factories and employees. The burden of costs is the major concern
and the cause of resistance by the suppliers in China. The burden
may be eased by coordinating procurement policies with social re-
sponsibility requirements within a multinational company and har-
monizing different standards among multinational companies.
Currently, multinational companies have problems in aligning
their low-price purchase policy with socially responsible guidelines.
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Procurement decisions are ultimately made by a procurement team
with an overriding cost-reduction mission. The screening for so-
cially responsible suppliers is conducted by another team, which
operates independently from final purchase decisions. The insuffi-
cient coordination causes purchase decisions to favor low-price
policies and ignores the costs of implementing corporate social ac-
countability in supplier factories. This pushes many suppliers in
China into a dilemma: to close or cheat. This situation may cause
multinational companies to consider themselves as winners ? win-
ning low prices and a socially responsible reputation. However,
such a view is incorrect. If supplier companies have to close, mul-
tinational companies will lose the opportunity to outsource and
gain cheap labor without incurring the costs and risks of direct in-
vestment. If supplier companies choose to cheat, then multina-
tional companies will incur more costs of supervision and auditing
or costs of remedying their reputations when their supplier's sweat-
shops get exposed to the public. Intensifying supervision is expen-
sive and inefficient.184 The outsiders (multinational companies and
auditing firms) can never know more than the insiders (the suppli-
ers). The costs of remedying reputation are enormous. In addi-
tion, socially responsible consumers in developed countries and
workers in developing countries lose. The consumers are cheated
by the socially responsible appearance of multinational companies
and their suppliers. The workers are harmed whether the supplier
companies choose to close or cheat. In sum, the root problem is
that the uncoordinated policies within a buyer company give sup-
pliers incentives to cheat and create the appearance of social re-
sponsibility without incurring the costs to honestly improve labor
conditions. To solve this problem, multinational companies should
directly include social responsibility experts in their procurement
teams, consult their social responsibility departments not only dur-
ing the screening stage but also at the final stage when the
purchase decisions are made, or at least provide more information
between procurement departments and corporate social responsi-
bility departments.
184 For example, a New York Times article reported that for GAP to "duplicate these
intensive [monitoring] efforts at each of the 4,000 independent factories it contracts with
would have taken about 4.5 percent of its annual profits of $877 million [in 2000]." Leslie
Kaufman & David Gonzalez, Made in Squalor: Reform Has Limits: Labor Standards Clash
With Global Reality, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2001, at Al.
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In addition to coordinating procurement policies within a mul-
tinational company, harmonization of different corporate social ac-
countability standards may reduce the cost of implementation for
suppliers. Currently, there are numerous standards in the global
supply chain. A supplier may be subject to conflicting standards
and frequent audits by their different buyers. Suppliers usually
complain that the contradictory standards and repeated audits dis-
turb their everyday operations. 185 Although most of the corporate
social accountability standards are based on the Conventions of
ILO or the declarations of the United Nations, the specific details
are diverse and sometimes conflicting, particularly with regard to
the implementation of cash standards.186 Moreover, conflicting
technical standards may undermine the reasonableness of corpo-
rate social accountability standards as perceived by the suppliers
and the workers. They may treat the standards as formalities
rather than internalized values. Harmonization can be accom-
plished in two ways: through negotiation among multinational
companies and non-governmental organizations on a sector basis
or negotiation between a supplier company and its buyers. The
SA8000 standard belongs to the former. Individual suppliers in de-
veloping countries do not have much say in the process of setting
these standards. The latter approach allows supplier companies to
play the central role in harmonizing different standards. Of course,
these two methods are not mutually exclusive.
B. Activate Consumer Awareness in China
Corporate social accountability standards at the moment are
primarily implemented in export-oriented companies in China. By
and large, companies targeting the Chinese domestic market are
not affected by the standards. This is because the standards are the
products of the anti-sweatshop movements in the western civil soci-
ety. Consumers in China have not yet shown a strong demand for
products made in a way that honors basic labor rights. Such lack of
awareness by Chinese consumers supports the Chinese suppliers'
185 See JORGENSEN ET AL., supra note 52, at 16-18 ("some suppliers report having been
subjected to more than 30-50 audits per year," and complain that "audits divert manage-
ment time and resources, disrupt workflow, and challenge planning processes"); see also
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNAT. CORPS., supra note 8, at 82 (some suppliers com-
plain of frequent and disturbing audits, and some workers in the survey said audits inter-
fered with their rest time).
186 For example, the details of implementation usually refer to the number and locations
of toilets, the location of fire extinguishers, the capacity of each dorm room, etc.
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perception that corporate social accountability standards are an
imposition by Western countries rather than a fundamental de-
mand by the populace in China. This perception is an obstacle to
improved labor rights.
How to trigger such consumer awareness and then to trans-
form the awareness into consumer movements is a difficult ques-
tion in China. Many Chinese consumers seem to prefer
government intervention by regulation and sanctions over con-
sumer movements.187 The reasons for this passive attitude by Chi-
nese consumers is likely multifaceted. Passivity may be due to the
long-time, tight state control of public interests and issues, resulting
in heavy reliance on intervention by the government. 188 Further,
consumer movements are a form of speech that may not be freely
allowed in China. Nevertheless, the heavy reliance on state regula-
tion to protect labor is inefficient and ineffective given the hetero-
geneity of the workplaces and the flexibility of employment
relationships in rapid and competitive markets.'8 9 In addition, the
heavy reliance on state intervention requires enhanced administra-
tion and enforcement by the government. However, the govern-
ment's lack of enforcement resources is an important reason for
the Chinese workers' torment.190 Complete dependence on state
intervention will at best prolong the Chinese workers' misery and
at worst never end their difficulty.
Moreover, Chinese consumers tend to favor environmental
protection over labor protection. 191 Although this may be because
the consumers may have more direct interests in a clean environ-
ment, media hype and the government promotion of environmen-
tal protection may also be important factors.192 The government
has been reluctant to encourage activism regarding labor rights.
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play an important
role in anti-sweatshop movements in western societies. However,
187 See SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNAT. CORPS., supra note 8, at 208 (finding in
the survey that consumers prefer government intervention).
188 See id. at 203-07 (describing the role of the Chinese government in the consumer
movement).
189 See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance
in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 408 (2004).
190 See LI-QING Li & YAN-LINc Li, supra note 28, at 154.
191 See SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNAT. CORPS., supra note 8, at 202.
192 See id.
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NGOs are undeveloped in China. 19 3 The government largely con-
trols awareness and issue formation regarding consumer rights.
The consumer rights protection and awareness of such issues pres-
ently rely on the efforts of the China Consumer's Association
(CCA), established in 1984 with the support of the government.194
CCA is superficially a non-governmental organization but is essen-
tially a government agency. Although the Law of the People's Re-
public of China on Protecting Consumers' Rights and Interests
recognizes that consumers have the right to form social groups in
accordance with the law to safeguard their legitimate rights and
interests,195 it is questionable that an independent organization
promoting labor rights would be approved by a government that
prohibits independent unions. In the long term, giving the reins of
the consumer movement to independent non-governmental organi-
zations would trigger consumer awareness more effectively. How-
ever, in the short term, reliance on the efforts of CCA is required
given the political reality.
CCA is promoting corporate social responsibility and con-
sumer rights, with a particular focus on product safety and environ-
mental protection.' 96  CCA emphasizes the linkage between
consumption and environmental protection in order to encourage
companies to produce environmentally friendly products. 19 7 How-
ever, CCA, as the leading and the most influential consumer organ-
ization in China, should also promote the linkage between
consumption and labor rights, another aspect of corporate social
193 See C. David Lee, Legal Reform in China: A Role for Nongovernmental Organiza-
tions, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 363, 375-82 (2000) (delineating the role of NGOs in China and
stating that "there is 'virtually no such thing' as a completely nongovernmental institution
in the PRC"); see also PEERENBOOM, supra note 109, at 201 (2002) (the CCP has put much
effort into controlling social organizations and thus many of the social organizations
formed in the last two decades are aligned with the interests of the Party).
194 CCA is a social organization established by the government. The funding of CCA is
provided by the government and social donations. See China Consumers' Association,
http://eng.cca.org.cn:801/page/aboutcca.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
195 See Law of the Peoples' Republic of China on the Protection of Consumer Rights
and Interests (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Natn'l People's Cong., Oct. 31, 1993,
effective Jan. 1, 1994), art. 12.
196 CCA supported "The Summit Forum of Corporate Social Responsibility and Con-
sumption Environment 2006." For detailed information of the Forum, see http://business.
sohu.com/s2006/qiyezeren/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2006).
197 CCA announced "consumption and environment" as its theme for 2006 and 2007.
See China Consumer's Association, CCA Confirms the Annual Theme for the Year, availa-
ble at http://eng.cca.org.cn:801/ (navigate through "CCA News") (last visited Oct. 28,
2007).
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responsibility. Given that labor rights violations are no less serious
than environmental pollution and that the majority of the Chinese
consumers are also the victims of labor abuse, the consumers
would gain from such a linkage.
C. Trigger Workers' Awareness of Labor Rights
Although the Labor Law provides a high level of protection
for workers, most workers in China are unaware of their rights.' 98
Surprisingly, many workers in the factories that are implementing
corporate social accountability standards do not understand the
meaning and purpose of the standards. 199 As the intended benefi-
ciaries of the standards, workers are passive, uninformed, non-con-
sulted receivers of the benefits. However, corporate social
accountability standards can never achieve success without the
workers' active participation. Workers are the most efficient
monitors of the standards. If workers would be aware of and un-
derstand the rights protected by the law and these standards, im-
provements in labor standards would likely accelerate and the goal
of labor protection might be achieved. Further, triggering the
awareness of workers in the export-oriented companies would
have a positive spillover effect on workers in domestic-oriented
companies because labor flows between companies may transmit
the awareness of labor rights to workers who are not covered by
the standards..
Currently, awareness and understanding of corporate social
accountability standards is disseminated to workers through em-
ployee brochures, posters, and the flow of labor between facto-
ries.200 However, the information is limited and fragmented. More
systematic and profound education is needed in order to provide a
fuller understanding of corporate social accountability standards
among workers.
VII. CONCLUSION
In response to consumer demand in developed countries, mul-
tinational companies have incorporated corporate social accounta-
198 Actually, ignorance of rights is not a phenomenon limited to poor workers in China,
but is common throughout the population. The legal consciousness among citizens was
seriously destroyed by the Cultural Revolution and cannot be rebuilt easily. See Orts,
supra note 139, at 61.
199 See SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANSNAT. CORPS., supra note 8, at 46-57.
200 See id. at 50.
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bility standards into the global supply chain. However, the impact
of the standards is primarily felt by the suppliers in developing
countries such as China. By examining the development of corpo-
rate social accountability standards in China, as well as the causes
of resistance to such standards, this Article argues that the stan-
dards are not protectionist and not incongruent with Chinese soci-
ety. However, effective implementation of corporate social
accountability standards requires a refined approach that considers
local circumstances in developing countries. Future research
should focus more on how to fairly implement the standards in a
way that provides the suppliers in developing countries incentives
to truly respect labor rights in their production.
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